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"EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE IN CANADA: TREATIES,
LEGISLATION, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION"
Kent McNeilt
Canadian courts have held that
Aboriginal title is extinguishable
consensually by means of a treaty
with the Aboriginal nation concerned.
Legislative extinguishment was also
possible prior to recognition of
Aboriginal title in the Constitution of
Canada in 1982. These methods of
extinguishment are discussed in Parts
1 and 2 of this article. It is suggested
that extinguishment by treaty could
occur only if that were permissible by
the law of the Aboriginal nation.
Extinguishment by legislation would
have depended on the legislative
body having the constitutional
authority to extinguish the title. In
addition, the legislative intention to
extinguish would have had to be clear
and plain. Finally, Part 3 of the
article discusses the recent emergence
in the Ontario Court of Appeal's
decision in the Chippewas of Sarnia
case of what appears to be a third
method of extinguishment of
Aboriginal title, namely
extinguishment through the exercise
ofjudicial discretion. This aspect of
the Court of Appeals decision is
criticized as a disturbing departure
from established judicial precedent
and legal principle.
Les tribunaux canadiens ont statu6 que
le titre autochtone peut 8tre 6teint par
consensus au moyen d'un trait6 avec la
nation autochtone concern~e.
L'extinction au moyen d'une loi 6tait
6galement possible avant la
reconnaissance du titre autochtone
dans la Constitution canadienne en
1982. Ces mthodes d'extinction sont
discut~es dans les parties 1 et 2 de cet
article. II est sugg6r6 que l'extinction
par voie d'un trait6 n'6tait possible
que si cela 6tait prrvu dans la loi de la
nation autochtone. L'extinction au
moyen d'une loi 6tait possible si
l'entit6 l~gislative avait l'autorit6
constitutionnelle d'6teindre le titre. En
outre, l'intention l6gislative d'6teindre
le titre devrait 8tre exprim~e dans un
langage clair et simple. Enfin, lapartie
3 de cet article traite de l'6mergence
r6cente, dans la decision Chippewas of
Sarnia, de ce qui semble 8tre une
troisi~mem~thode d'extinction dutitre
autochtone, c'est-4-dire l'extinction
par voie de la discr~tionjudiciaire. Cet
aspect de la decision de la Cour
d'appel est critiqu6e comme un 6cart
inqui~tant dupr~c~dentjudiciaire et de
la r~gle de droit 6tablie.
t Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. I would like to thank James Reynolds, Kerry Wilkins, and
two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on a draft of this article. The financial
assistance and other support of the Delgamuukw National Review, Assembly ofFirst Nations, is
also gratefully acknowledged. I am, however, entirely responsible for the views expressed in this
article, as well as for any errors and other shortcomings.
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Extinguishment ofAboriginal Title in Canada
I. INTRODUCTION •
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia' the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed
that Aboriginal title is a proprietary interest in land,2 and held that it includes both
surface and subsurface resources, regardless ofwhether the Aboriginal title holders used
those resources traditionally.3 Moreover, since the enactment of section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982,4 which recognized and affirmed Aboriginal and treaty rights,
Aboriginal title has been constitutionally protected.5 This means that it can be infringed
only by or pursuant to constitutionally valid legislation that meets the justification test
that was laid down in R. v. Sparrow,6 and held to be applicable to Aboriginal title in
Delgamuukw.7 However, the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal title and other
Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982 has meant that they are no longer subject to
legislative extinguishment, even by Parliament.8 Since then, Aboriginal title should be
extinguishable only by voluntary surrender of that title to the Crown, or by means of
constitutional amendment of section 35. We shall see, however, that the recent decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney-
General)' subjected legal actions for declaration ofAboriginal title to judicial discretion,
thereby creating what may be a new form of extinguishment.
Given that the Supreme Court has held that legislative authority to extinguish
Aboriginal rights was taken away by section 35, we can confine our discussion of that
1 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Delgamuukw cited to
S.C.R.].
2 Ibid., see especiallyparas. 113, 138, 140, Lamer C.J. See also Canadian Pacific Ltd.
v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 487 at 504 [hereinafter Canadian Pacific
cited to S.C.R.].
' Delgamuukw, supra note 1, see especially paras. 116-24, Lamer C.J.
4 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1982].
1 For discussion, see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected
PropertyRight" [hereinafter "Constitutionally Protected Property Right"] inK. McNeil, Emerging
Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 292 [hereinafter Emerging Justice?].
6 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Sparrow cited to S.C.R.].
Briefly, the test is that the government must justify the infringement by showing a substantial and
compelling legislative objective, and proving that the Crown's fiduciary obligations to the
Aboriginal people in question have been respected. See also R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R.
723, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 648 [hereinafter Gladstone cited to S.C.R.].
I Supra note I at paras. 160-69, Lamer C.J. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. suggested that
provincial legislatures (as well as the Canadian Parliament) can infringe Aboriginal title, but that
conclusion is questionable on division ofpowers grounds: see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and
the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" in Emerging Justice?,
supra note 5 at 249; N. Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and
Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev.
317; K. Wilkins, "Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185.
1 SeeR. v. Van derPeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 atpara. 28, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 atpara.
28, Lamer C.J. [hereinafter Van derPeet cited to S.C.R.]; Mitchell v. MN.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911
at par. 11, [2001] 3 C.N.L.R. 122 at para. 11, McLachlin C.J. [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
9 (2001), 51 O.R. (3d) 641, [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 56 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused [2001] 4 C.N.L.R. iv. [hereinafter Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.) cited to O.R.]
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means of extinguishment to the period before section 35 was enacted. The reason why
this is still important today is that the Supreme Court in Sparrow decided that
constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights are those rights that were in existence when
section 35 came into force on April 17, 1982. Rights that had been validly extinguished
prior to that time were no longer in existence, and so were not recognized and affirmed."
Parts One and Two of this article will therefore focus on the ways in which Aboriginal
title might have been extinguished prior to the enactment of section 35. The first of these
was through voluntary surrender of the title to the Crown by means of an agreement in
the form of a treaty or modem land claims settlement." As already mentioned,
Aboriginal title could also have been extinguished unilaterally by or pursuant to
legislation. As the legal issues raised by legislative extinguishment are numerous and
complex, we will spend the most time on this second means ofextinguishment. 2 Finally,
Part Three will be devoted to a critical examination of the Chippewas ofSarnia case and
the application ofjudicial discretion to Aboriginal title claims in the courts.
I. EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE BY AGREEMENT
There does not seem to be any doubt that, from the perspective of Canadian law,
Aboriginal title has been and continues to be extinguishable by voluntary surrender of
that title to the Crown. The Royal Proclamation of 1763' 3 envisaged just such a
procedure for acquisition of Indian lands when it provided that, if any of the Indian
nations or tribes were inclined to dispose of their lands in the Crown's North American
colonies, those lands could be purchased only by the Crown or a proprietary
government 4 "at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for
30 Sparrow, supra note 6 at 1091-93. Lamer C.J. said the same thing about Aboriginal
title in Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 172.
" As stated above, this is still possible today. Note too that land claims agreements are
really treaties by another name. This is acknowledged by s. 35(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which provides: "For greater certainty, in subsection (1) 'treaty rights' includes rights that now
exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired." See also the Nisga'a Final
Agreement, initialled August 4, 1998, ch. 2, para. 1: "This Agreement is a treaty and a land claims
agreement within the meaning of sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982."
2 See also P. Joffe and M. E. Turpel, Extinguishment of the Rights of Aboriginal
Peoples: Problems and Alternatives, 3 vols., June 1995, CD-ROM: For Seven Generations: An
Information Legacy ofthe Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples, 1997) see especially vol. 1, 233-50.
13 Royal Proclamation (1763), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. I.
" At the time the Proclamation was issued, the only proprietary government in what is
now Canada was the Hudson's Bay Company, and it surrendered its governmental authority to the
Crown in 1870: see Deed of Surrender, Schedule C to the Rupert's Land and North-Western
Territory Order, 23 June 1870, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 9. In 1817, the Earl of
Selkirk, acting under an indenture from the Company, purported to purchase lands in the name
of the Crown from the Saulteaux and Cree Nations for his Red River Settlement: see A. Morris,
The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories (Toronto:
Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880) at 13-15 (the treaty of purchase and the indenture are reproduced
at 299-302). The validity of this treaty is doubtful. In any case, the same lands were included in
Treaty 1, entered into by the Crown in 1871 (reproduced ibid. at 313-16). Note too that James
Douglas, while he was still chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company at Fort Victoria, purchased
lands in the 1850s from some of the Indian nations on Vancouver Island: see P. Tennant,
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that Purpose". 5 At the same time, the Proclamation forbid private acquisition of Indian
lands, affimning a policy that is also part of the common law of Aboriginal title.' 6 The
inalienability of Aboriginal title other than by surrender to the Crown means that it
cannot be extinguished by transfer to anyone else.
Although Canadian law allows for the surrender of Aboriginal title to the
Crown, this does not mean that it is surrenderable under Aboriginal law. Leroy Little
Bear has explained that Aboriginal peoples generally did not have a concept of land
ownership that would have included authority to transfer absolute title to the Crown.
They received their land from the Creator, subject to certain conditions, including an
obligation to share it with plants and animals. Moreover, the land belongs not just to
living Aboriginal persons, but to past and future generations as well. 7 He concluded:
In summary, the standard or norm of the aboriginal peoples' law is that land
is not transferable and therefore is inalienable. Land and benefits therefrom
maybe shared with others, and when Indian nations entered into treaties with
European nations, the subject of the treaty, from the Indians' viewpoint, was
not the alienation of the land but the sharing of the land.'
8
Little Bear's point that, under Aboriginal law, the treaties could not have amounted to
a transfer of land to the Crown but instead involved a sharing of it, has been affirmed by
many others.' 9 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, after examining
Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990) at 18-20.
1 Royal Proclamation (1763), supra note 13 at 6. For detailed discussion of the
Proclamation's Indian provisions see B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian
Peoples as Affected by the Crown 's Acquisition of their Territories (D. Phil. Thesis, Unversity of
Oxford 1979), reprinted (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979)
[hereinafter Land Rights].
16 See Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at paras. 113 and 129, Lamer C.J.C; Osoyoos Indian
Band v. Oliver (Town) (2001), 206 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at para. 46, [2002] 1 W.W.R. 23 at para. 46
(S.C.C.), Iacobucci J. [hereinafter Osoyoos Indian Band cited to D.L.R.]. For discussion, see K.
McNeil, "Self-Government and the Inalienability ofAboriginal Title"47 McGilL.. [forthcoming
in 2002].
17 For an indication that communal rights in England cannot be surrendered for the
same reason, see Wyldv. Silver, [1963] 1 Ch. 243 at 255-56, 1 Q.B. 169 at 180-81 (C.A.). Lord
Denning M.R. there stated that the present inhabitants of a parish could not waive or abandon a
right to hold a fair because that would take the right away from future generations.
11 L. Little Bear, "Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian 'Grundnorm.' in J. R. Ponting,
ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1986) 243 at 247.
' See Treaty 7 Elders et al., The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal
& Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), see especially 113-23, 144-45 [hereinafter
True Spirit]; H. Cardinal & W. Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That
Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary
Press, 2000), see especially 34-47. At 3 1, Cardinal and Hildebrandt quote Elder Peter Waskahat
of the Frog Lake First Nation: "The sacred earth could never be sold or given away, according to
the principles of the First Nations, but it could be shared." See also the statement of Chief Harold
Turner, Swampy Cree Tribal Council, at a public hearing of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, The Pas, Manitoba, 20 May 1992, quoted in N. Zlotkin, "Interpretation of the Prairie
2001-2002]
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Aboriginal conceptions of property and tenure, said this about the bundle of rights and
obligations contained therein:
Excluded was the right to alienate or sell land to outsiders, to destroy or
diminish lands or resources, or to appropriate lands or resources for private
gain without regard to reciprocal obligations.2 °
This means that, in situations where the law of an Aboriginal nation prohibits an absolute
transfer of that nation's title, voluntary extinguishment by treaty or land claims
agreement would not be possible. However, the written texts of many Indian treaties do
contain a provision that purports to be an outright surrender of Aboriginal title to the
Crown. Treaty 6, for example, entered into in 1876 and relating to a large area in what
is now central Saskatchewan and Alberta, contains a clause that is standard in the
numbered treaties:
The Plain and Wood Cree Tribes of Indians, and all other the Indians
inhabiting the district hereinafter described and defined, do hereby cede,
release, surrender and yield up to the Government ofthe Dominion of Canada
for Her Majesty the Queen and her successors forever, all their rights, titles
and privileges whatsoever, to the lands included within the following
limits... 21
Given that the law of the Cree and other nations who entered into this treaty apparently
did not permit an absolute surrender of their Aboriginal title,22 does this mean that the
treaty is invalid because there was a fundamental misunderstanding between the parties?
According to Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, this is not the position of the First
Nation Elders in Saskatchewan. As the Elders think that substantial agreement was
reached at the treaty negotiations, for them "what is at issue is not whether or not treaties
exist, but whether a mutually acceptable record of them can now be agreed upon and
Treaties" in 0. Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme
Court's Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000) 183 at 186: "Our ancestors
did not sign a real estate deal as you cannot give away something you do not own. No, the treaties
were signed as our symbol of good faith to share the land."
20 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the
Relationship, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 459 [hereinafter RCAP
Report].
21 Morris, supra note 14 at 352. For discussion, see J. L. Taylor, "Two Views on the
Meaning of Treaties Six and Seven" in R. Price, ed., The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties
(Toronto: Butterworth Press, 1987) 9 at 39-45.
22 Cardinal & Hildebrandt, supra note 19 at 58, stated: "At the focus sessions [that the
authors held with Elders], when the 'extinguishment clauses' of the written treaty texts were read,
translated, and explained, the Elders reacted with incredulity and disbelief. They found it hard
to believe that anyone, much less the Crown, could seriously believe that First Nations would ever
have agreed to 'extinguish' their God-given rights." See also S. Venne, "Understanding Treaty
6: An Indigenous Perspective" in M. Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays
on Law, Equality, and Respectfor Difference (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1997) 173, see especially 192-93: "The Chiefs and Elders could not have sold the lands to the
settlers as they could only share the lands according to the Cree, Saulteau, Assiniboine, and Dene
laws."
[Vol 33:2
Extinguishment ofAboriginal Title in Canada
implemented."'  This involves interpreting the written terms in light of First Nations'
oral traditions, the records of the negotiations, and the historical context, 24 which is an
approach that has been endorsed and applied by the Supreme Court of Canada.'
It is not my intention to assess the validity or proper interpretation of any
particular treaty. Rather, I want to make the general point that voluntary extinguishment
of Aboriginal title, while permissible in Canadian law, may not be permissible in
Aboriginal law. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the treaties have to be
interpreted as the parties, especially the Aboriginal parties, would have understood them
at the time.26 As the Aboriginal parties to the treaties would presumably have acted in
accordance with their own laws, they cannot have intended to surrender their entire
interest to the Crown if that would have violated those laws. Aboriginal understandings
of the treaties therefore need to be assessed in light of relevant Aboriginal laws.
But even if the law of an Aboriginal treaty nation did permit it to surrender its
entire interest to the Crown (which may never have been the case), this does not mean
that the surrender provision can be taken at face value. One still has to examine the oral
traditions of that nation as well as evidence of the treaty negotiations and surrounding
circumstances to determine what was actually intended by the Aboriginal parties.27 This
is particularly so in treaties like the last nine numbered treaties where certain rights in
relation to land use, specifically hunting and fishing rights, were expressly preserved in
the written versions.2" As Patrick Macklem has pointed out in his analysis of Treaty 9
(1905-6), the preservation of those traditional uses of the land was consistent with the
Aboriginal parties' intention to retain land rights that were essential to their ways of
life.29 So even the written terms contemplated some sharing of the lands, 0 though not
2 Cardinal & Hildebrandt, ibid. at 59.
24 Ibid. at 48-52.
2 See e.g. R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025,70 D.L.R. (4th) 427; R. v. Badger, [1996]
1 S.C.R. 771,133 D.L.R. (4th) 324; R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, 170 D.L.R. (4th) 385;
R. v. Marshall [No. 1], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 513.
26 In addition to the cases cited in note 25 above, see Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 387,24 D.L.R. (4th) 390; R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901,4 W.W.R. 97 per Wilson
J. (dissenting on the interpretation of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement); Mitchell v.
Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Mitchell cited to
S.C.RK.
27 See Re Paulette and Registrar of Titles [No. 2] (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8,9 C.N.L.C.
307 (N.W.T.S.C.) [hereinafter Re Paulette (N.W.T.S.C.) cited to D.L.R.], rev'd on other grounds
(1975), 63 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 9 C.N.L.C. 342 (N.W.T.C.A.), aff'd [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628, 72 D.L.R.
(3d) 161. In regard to Treaty 8 (1899) and Treaty 11 (1921), Morrow J. found that, on the
evidence, there was "doubt as to whether the full aboriginal title had been extinguished, certainly
in the minds of the Indians": Re Paulette (N.W.T.S.C.) ibid. at 35.
28 Although the written versions of Treaties 1 and 2, signed in 1871, do not contain a
clause relating to hunting and fishing rights, oral promises made by the Treaty Commissioners
reveal that those rights were to continue: see K. McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing
Rights in the Prairie Provinces of Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law
Centre, 1983) at 4-7.
29 p. Macklem, "The Impact of Treaty 9 on Natural Resource Development in Northern
Ontario" in Asch, supra note 22 at 97, see especially 119-20. See also S. Imai, "Treaty Lands and
Crown Obligations: The 'Tracts Taken Up' Provision" (2001) 27 Queen's L.J. 1; K. McNeil, "The
High Cost of Accepting Benefits from the Crown: A Comment on the Temagami Indian Land
Case" in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5, 25 at 49-56 [hereinafter "High Cost of Accepting
2001-2002]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
necessarily to the degree that the Aboriginal parties had in mind.3'
III. LEGISLATIVE EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
A. Distinguishing Between Legislative and Executive Authority
In Euro-Canadian political theory and practice, governmental authority (apart
from judicial functions) can be either legislative or executive. Unfortunately, this
distinction has all too often been ignored where Aboriginal title is concerned, causing
misunderstanding of how that title could be extinguished unilaterally prior to April 17,
1982. It is therefore essential to begin our discussion of unilateral extinguishment by
distinguishing between these two kinds of governmental authority and by clarifying the
common law extent of each in relation to property rights.
Legislative authority generally involves law-making, whereas executive
authority, which is derived either from the royal prerogative or from statute, does not.
Executive functions include such things as policy-making and carrying out laws that
legislative bodies have enacted. Executive authority therefore tends to be either political
or administrative, and can "range from the determination and implementation of matters
of high policy to an extensive array of individual acts and decisions, such as placing
government contracts, making grants, loans and compulsorypurchase orders, and issuing
permits and licences."32 In our parliamentary system, legislative authority is exercised
either by elected legislatures, or by persons or bodies that have received it by delegation
from a legislature. Executive authority, on the other hand, is exercised on behalf of the
Crown by cabinet ministers and other governmental officials. Leaving aside the
Aboriginal peoples' inherent right of self-government for present purposes,33 the
Benefits"] (regarding the Robinson-Huron Treaty, 1850). InHafwayRiverFirst Nation v. British
Columbia (Ministry of Forests) Finch J.A. observed in reference to Treaty 8 (1899) that the
Crown's right to take up surrendered lands "for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other
purposes" was not unrestricted, as it had to be read in light of the Indians' right to hunt on those
lands, and should not be interpreted in a way that "would render the right to hunt meaningless":
(1999), 178 D.L.R. (4th) 666 atpara. 134, [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 atpara. 134 (B.C.C.A.). Compare
R. v. Catarat, [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 139 at paras. 31-34, 191 Sask.R. 223 at paras. 31-34 (Sask.
Q.B.), aff'd [2001] 2 C.N.L.R. 158, 207 Sask.R. 57 (Sask. C.A.).
30 See Manitoba, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba: The Justice
System and Aboriginal People, vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991) at 149.
31 See True Spirit, supra note 19, see especially 144-45; RCAP Report, supra note 20,
vol. 2 at 44-47; Venne, supra note 22, see especially 192-93; Cardinal & Hildebrandt, supra note
19, see especially 62-67. Compare L.Hickey, R.L. Lighting & G. Lee, "T.A.R.R. Interview with
Elders Program" in Price, supra note 21 at 105, where Lynn Hickey stated in reference to Treaty
7: "Not one elder mentions that the treaty had anything to do with giving up land or sharing it with
white people. Rather, Treaty Seven is an agreement that was made to establish peace, to stop the
Indians from killing each other, and to put an end to the disruptions caused by liquor."
32 Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, vol. 1(I), 4th ed. reissue (London: Butterworths, 200 1)
at para. 18.
13 As our discussion involves the authority of other governments in Canada to
extinguish Aboriginal title, we are not concerned here with the governmental authority of the
Aboriginal peoples themselves. On the inherent right of self-government, see Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government and the
[Vol 33:2
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Canadian Constitution has distributed law-making authority between Parliament and the
provincial legislatures.34 Executive authority follows the same division of powers.35
It is fundamental to the parliamentary system of government that Canada
received from Britain that legal rights can only be infringed or taken away by or pursuant
to unequivocal legislation.36 This is particularly so where property rights are concerned,
as they have always enjoyed special protection in the common law.37 Regarding land,
the rule against "executive taking" dates from at least 1215, when chapter 29 of the
Magna Carta specified that "[n]o Freeman shall ... be disseised [i.e., dispossessed of his
land] ... but by [the] lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land."3" This
restraint on the authority of the executive branch of government is basic to the rule of
law,39 as it protects property against government confiscation except in accordance with
law.4" Simply put, it means that there is no prerogative power to confiscate or extinguish
Constitution (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1993); K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in
Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5 at 58;
Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, [2000] 4
C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.); Mitchell v. MN.R., supra note 8, Binnie J.
3" Constitution Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5,
see especially ss. 91, 92. See Attorney-Generalfor Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada,
[1912] A.C. 571 at 581, 584,3 D.L.R. 509 at 511,513 (P.C.); Murphy v. C.P.R., [1958] S.C.R.
626 at 643, 15 D.L.R. (2d) 145 at 154; Jones v. Attorney-General of New Brunswick, [1975] 2
S.C.R. 182 at 195,45 D.L.R. (3d) 583 at 593.
" See Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Quebec, sub nom. Mowat
v. Casgrain (1897), 6 Que. Q.B. 12 at 22-24 (Que. C.A.); Bonanza Creek Gold Mining v. The
King, [ 1916] A.C. 566 at 579-80,26 D.L.R. 273 at 279-80 (P.C.); The Queen v. Secretary ofState
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta, [1981] 4
C.N.L.R. 86 at 93, [1982] Q.B. 892 at 913 (Eng. C.A.) [hereinafter Indian Association of Alberta
cited to C.N.L.R.], Lord Denning M.R.
36 For more detailed discussion, see K. McNeil, "Racial Discrimination and Unilateral
Extinguishment of Native Title" in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5, 357 at 359-69 [hereinafter
"Racial Discrimination"].
37 SeeW. Blackstone, Commentaries on theLaws ofEngland, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1765-69) at 134-41; H. Broom, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Lav
and Exemplifled by Cases, 2d ed. by G. L. Denman (London: W. Maxwell & Son, 1885) at 225-
45; Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 at 219, 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68 at 83, Dickson J.;
Leiriao v. Val-Bilair (Town), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 349 at 356-57, 129 N.R. 188 at214-15, L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. (dissenting). For further discussion, see "Constitutionally Protected Property Right",
supra note 5, especially at 293-95.
38 Magna Carta, 17 John. In Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Lord
Parmoor said that "[s]ince Magna Carta the estate of a subject in lands or buildings has been
protected against the prerogative of the Crown": [1920] A.C. 508 at 569, 89 L.J. Ch. 417 at 443
[hereinafter De Keyser's Royal Hotel cited to A.C.].
" See Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1030, 95 E.R. 807 (C.P.) [hereinafter
Entick cited to St. Tr.].
40 In Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria, Lord Atkin said that "no member of
the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition
that he can support the legality of his action before a court ofjustice": [1931] A.C. 662 at 670,
100 L.J.P.C. 152 at 157 (P.C.) [hereinafter Eshugbayi Eleko]. See also J.W. Ely Jr., The
Guardian ofEvery Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights, 2d ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998) at 13-14, 54-55.
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property rights in time ofpeace.4 Any executive authority to take or extinguish property
rights must, therefore, be created by legislation because only legislatures have the
constitutional authority to interfere with property rights.42
In the British and Canadian constitutional tradition, there is no general restraint
on the legislative power to take private property.43 Instead, the courts have used
principles of statutory interpretation to protect property rights in the absence of clear
legislative intention to infringe them. This is done in two ways. First, for the legislation
itself to operate as a statutory taking, the intention to take the property has to be
unequivocally expressed.' Second, a delegation from the legislature to the executive or
some other body, authorizing it to take private property, has to be clearly expressed as
well.45 In either case, any ambiguity will be construed in favour of the property owner.
Moreover, the courts will find that there is an obligation to pay compensation for any
confiscated property unless the right to compensation is unequivocally precluded by the
legislation.46
To sum up, fundamental principles of Anglo-Canadian constitutional law
4 In wartime the Crown can take private property for defence purposes, but only if
compensation is paid: see De Keyser's Royal Hotel, supra note 38; Commercial and Estates Co.
ofEgypt v. Board of Trade, [1925] 1 K.B. 271 at 294-97, 19 LI. L. Rep. 275 at 281-84 (C.A.),
Atkin L.J.; Burmah Oil Co. v. LordAdvocate, [1965] A.C. 75, [1964] 2 All. E.R. 348 (H.L.).
42 See Broom, supra note 37 at 231: "no man's property can legally be taken from him
or invaded by the direct act or command ofthe sovereign, without the consent of the subject, given
expressly or impliedly through parliament." Where land is concerned, modem expropriation
statutes are the main source of this kind of executive authority: see K. Davies, Law of Compulsory
Purchase and Compensation, 3d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1978), see especially 9-10; E.C.E.
Todd, TheLaw ofExpropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992),
see especially 26-29. In Rugby Water Board v. Shaw Fox, Lord Pearson said that "compulsory
acquisition and compensation for it are entirely creations of statute": [1973] A.C. 202 at 214,
[1972] 2 W.L.R. 757 at 763 (H.L.).
4' Regarding Britain, see T.R.S. Allan, "Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law:
Democracy and Constitutionalism" (1985) 44 Cambridge L.J. 111. On the decision not to include
protection for property rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see J. McBean,
"The Implications of Entrenching Property Rights in Section 7 of the Charter of Rights" (1988)
26 Alta. L. Rev. 548.
" See Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, [ 1933] S.C.R. 629
at 638, 4 D.L.R. 545 at 552, Duff C.J.; Colet v. R., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 10, 119 D.L.R. (3d) 521
at 528; R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1994) at 370-76.
"5 See Simpson v. South Staffordshire Water Works Co. (1865), 34 L.J. Ch. 380 at 387,
46 E.R.1082 at 1084, Westbury L.J.; Thomson v. Halifax Power Co. (1914), 16 D.L.R. 424 at
432,47 N.S.R. 536 at 550-51, Graham J.; Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King, [1920] 1 K.B.
854 at 866, 123 L.T. 58 at 61, Slater J.; Attorney-Generalfor Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd.,
[1952] A.C. 427 at 450 (P.C.), (sub. nom. Canada (Canadian Wheat Board) v. Manitoba Pool
Elevators) [ 1952] 3 D.L.R. 433 at 446-47, Radcliffe L.J.; Leiriao v. Val-Bilair (Town),supra note
37 at 356-57, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (dissenting); and discussion in Todd, supra note 42 at 27-29.
46 See Western Counties Railway Co. v. Windsor and Annapolis Railway Co. (1882),
7 A.C. 178 at 188 (P.C.); Commissioner of Public Works (Cape Colony) v. Logan, [1903] A.C.
355 at 363-64 (P.C.); Central ControlBoard (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd., [ 1919]
A.C. 744 at 752 (H.L.), Atkinson L.J.; De Keyser's Royal Hotel, supra note 38 at 542 (Atkinson
L.J.), 576 and 579 (Parmoor L.J.); Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. R., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, 88 D.L.R.
(3d) 462.
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prevent the executive branch from extinguishing anyone's property rights without clear
and plain statutory authority. Moreover, even legislative taking will be subjected to
careful judicial scrutiny by construing statutes so as to preserve property rights, and if
that is not possible by presuming that the right to compensation has not been taken away.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court held in Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title is a
proprietary interest in land. So even before receiving constitutional recognition in 1982,
it should have enjoyed the same common law protection as other property rights.47 We
will now examine Canadian case law to determine whether this protection has in fact
been accorded to Aboriginal title.
B. Executive Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canadian
Jurisprudence
Most of the confusion over the authority of the Crown to extinguish Aboriginal
title by executive action arises from the decision of the Privy Council in St. Catherine's
Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen.4" In that case, Lord Watson regarded
Aboriginal or Indian title as having arisen from the Royal Proclamation of 1763." 9
Interpreting that document, he said it shows that "the tenure of the Indians was a personal
and usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign."5  Some
Canadian judges have taken this to mean that Aboriginal title is subject to the will of the
Crown, and so is extinguishable by the executive without legislative authorization. For
example, inAttorney Generalfor Ontario v. BearlslandFoundation, Steele J. said this:
In a previous section on the nature of aboriginal rights, I determined that St.
Catherine's Milling case stood for the proposition that aboriginal rights exist
at the pleasure of the Sovereign. An obvious corollary to this proposition is
that aboriginal rights may be unilaterally extinguished by the Crown.5'
This aspect of his judgment was affinmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, where it was
explicitly held that the Crown by means ofa treaty could extinguish the Aboriginal rights
even of Indian bands or tribes that were not parties to it.52 As the treaty in question (the
Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850) had been entered into by the Crown in its executive
capacity,53 the Court of Appeal clearly accepted the concept of unilateral executive
4 See "Constitutionally Protected Property Right", supra note 5.
48 (1889) 14 App.Cas. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherine's].
41 See Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 114, Lamer C.J.
SO St. Catherine's, supra note 48 at 54.
51 (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 353 at 436, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. I at 77-78 (Ont. S.C.)
[hereinafterBearlsland(Ont. S.C.) cited to C.N.L.R.]. See also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
(1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 at 415-16, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97 at 345-46 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
Delgamuukw (B.C.S.C.) cited to D.L.R.]. Note, however, that in Bear Island, Steele J. moved
from executive extinguishment to legislative extinguishment without clearly distinguishing
between the two (ibid. at 78-80).
52 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation, [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 85-
88, 68 O.R. (2d) 394 at 410-13 [hereinafter Bear Island Foundation (C.A.) cited to C.N.L.R.].
11 Ratification by the Governor General in Council (not the legislature) was, in the
Court of Appeal's opinion, "a plain and unambiguous declaration by the Sovereign that the
aboriginal title was extinguished" (ibid. at 88).
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extinguishment of Aboriginal title. 4
Starting with Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,"5 the Supreme
Court has gradually been deconstructing the concept of Aboriginal title formulated by
Lord Watson in the St. Catherine's case. In Calder, Judson J. (Martland and Ritchie JJ.
concurring) held that the Royal Proclamation, though taken to be the source of
Aboriginal title by the Privy Council, is not the sole source. 6 In an oft-quoted passage,
he said:
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot
owe its origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers
came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land
as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means
and it does not help one in the solution of this problem to call it a "personal
or usufructuary right".
57
This passage also reveals that he did not find Lord Watson's description of Indian title
as a "personal and usufructuary right" to be particularly useful. He nonetheless said that
there could be no question that Aboriginal title was "dependent on the goodwill of the
Sovereign","8 and went on to express the view that Aboriginal title had been generally
extinguished in British Columbia by a series of proclamations and ordinances that were
clearly legislative in nature. 9 On this issue of extinguishment the Supreme Court split
evenly,' as Hall J. (dissenting, with the concurrence of Laskin and Spence JJ.) was of
the view that Aboriginal title could not "be extinguished except by surrender to the
Crown orby competent legislative authority, and then only by specific legislation."'" For
him, the onus of proving unilateral extinguishment is on the Crown and requires "clear
' The Court said: "It is also clear (at least prior to the enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982) that the sovereign power can unilaterally extinguish
aboriginal rights" (ibid. at 87). For critical commentary, see K. McNeil, "The Temagami Indian
Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket" in M. Bray and A. Thomson, eds., Temagami:
A Debate on Wilderness (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1990) 185 at 200-207 [hereinafter "Temagami
Indian Land Claim"]. Note that the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the decisions of Steele J.
and the Court of Appeal that the claimed Aboriginal rights had been extinguished, but on the
narrower ground that the Temagami Indians had adhered to the Robinson-Huron Treaty: Ontario
(Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570, [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 79,
commented on in "High Cost of Accepting Benefits", supra note 29.
1s [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 [hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.].
56 Ibid. at 322.
57 Ibid. at 328.
58 Ibid.
" Acting pursuant to Acts of Parliament (21 & 22 Vict., c.99; 29 & 30 Vict, c.67), the
British Crown had delegated authority to legislate in the Colony of British Columbia, first to
Governor James Douglas who issued the Proclamations, and then to the Governor and Legislative
Council, which made the Ordinances (ibid. at 406-14, Hall J. (dissenting)).
o The Nisga'a were unsuccessful nonetheless because a majority of the Court held that
they could not bring an action for declaration of their Aboriginal title without a fiat from the
Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia giving them permission to sue the Crown in right of the
Province, see infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
61 Calder, supra note 55 at 402.
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and plain" legislative intent.62 As the Nisga'a (spelled Nishga in the judgments) had not
surrendered their title, and as it had not been extinguished by specific legislation, in Hall
J.'s opinion the Court should have declared it to exist.6"
The Supreme Court returned to the matter of Aboriginal title in Guerin v. The
Queen.' As that case involved a surrender of reserve land for the purpose of leasing,
unilateral extinguishment was not an issue. Dickson J. (as he then was) nonetheless
accepted the Court's holding in Calder that "aboriginal title existed in Canada (at least
where it had not been extinguished by appropriate legislative action) independently of
the Royal Proclamation.""5 In Calder, he said, "this Court recoguized aboriginal title as
a legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupation and possession of their tribal
lands." Moreover, in his discussion of the nature of Aboriginal title, Dickson J. said
that the Privy Council's emphasis in the St. Catherine's case "on the personal nature of
aboriginal title stemmed in part from constitutional arrangements peculiar to Canada."'67
So when the land in question in St. Catherine's was surrendered to the Crown by Treaty
3 in 1873, "the entire beneficial interest was held to have passed, because of the personal
and usufructuary nature of the Indian's right, to the Province of Ontario under s. 109 [of
the Constitution Act, 1867] rather than to Canada."68 Dickson J. went on to say that,
although the characterization of Aboriginal title as "a personal and usufructuary right"
has been questioned in cases such as Calder, there is a "core of truth" to that description
which, like the words "beneficial interest" that are sometimes used, attempts to describe
the sui generis interest which the Indians have in their land by "applying a somewhat
inappropriate terminology drawn from general property law."69 In a key phrase, he then
said that "the sui generis interest which the Indians have in the land is personal in the
sense that it cannot be transferred to a grantee".7" This meaning of "personal" has since
been confirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul.7 In
reference to the description of Aboriginal title in St Catherine's as a "personal and
usufructuary right", the Court said:
This has at times been interpreted as meaning that Indian title is merely a
personal right which cannot be elevated to the status of a proprietary interest
62 Ibid. at 404. Note that both Hall J.'s opinion that "clear and plain" legislative intent
must be shown for Aboriginal title to be extinguished, and his view that the Proclamations and
Ordinances did not extinguish the Nisga'a's title, have been accepted by the Supreme Court of
Canada, see infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
63 In Hall J.'s view, even if the Proclamations and Ordinances relied upon by Judson
J. had exhibited the requisite intent (which he found they did not), they still would have been
ineffective because the Governor and Legislative Council lacked the authority to extinguish
Aboriginal title (ibid. at 413).
6 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter Guerin cited to S.C.R.].
6 Ibid. at 377 [emphasis added].
6 Ibid. at 376.
67 Ibid. at 380.
68 Ibid. at 380-81.
69 Ibid. at 381-82.
70 Ibid. at 382. This explanation of the meaning of "personal" had already been given
by Duff J. in Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada, [1921] 1 A.C. 401
at 408, 56 D.L.R. 373 at 377 (Qubec P.C.).
71 Supra note 2.
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so as to compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests.
However, we are of the opinion that the right was characterized as purely
personal for the sole purpose of emphasizing its generally inalienable nature;
it could not be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone other than the
Crown.72
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer followed the usual pattern of beginning
his discussion of Aboriginal title with the St. Catherine's case. He acknowledged that
subsequent cases have demonstrated that the words "personal and usufructuary" are
... not particularly helpful to explain the various dimensions of aboriginal
title. What the Privy Council sought to capture is that aboriginal title is a sui
generis interest in land. Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in
order to distinguish it from "normal" proprietary interests, such as fee
simple.
73
He then confirmed the essential point made in Guerin and Canadian Pacific that
Aboriginal title is only "personal" in the sense of being inalienable other than by
surrender to the Crown. As "[t]his Court has taken pains to clarify", he said, this is the
sense in which the word "personal" has been used; it "does not mean that aboriginal title
is a non-proprietary interest which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy
the land and cannot compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests".74
The Supreme Court has therefore modified the position of the Privy Council in
St. Catherine's in two important respects. First, it has decided that Aboriginal title does
not depend on the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Instead, its source is "the prior
occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples."75 Second, the Court has rejected any
implication that the description of Aboriginal title as a "personal and usufructuary right"
means that it is non-proprietary. While sui generis in certain respects, Aboriginal title
is a proprietary interest in land that stands on an equal footing and is entitled to the same
respect as common law interests such as fee simple estates. Both of these modifications
have significant implications for extinguishment, in particular in regard to Lord Watson's
statement in St. Catherine's that Aboriginal title is "dependent upon the good will of the
Sovereign.76 Even if his Lordship meant by those words that Aboriginal title can be
extinguished by the Crown acting executively,77 that position is no longer tenable in light
72 Ibid. at 677.
7 Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 112.
I4 bid. at para. 113. For discussion, see "Constitutionally Protected Property Right",
supra note 5 at 295-301.
7' Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 114, confirming the view expressed by Dickson
J. in Guerin, supra note 64 at 376-79. For discussion, see K. McNeil, "The Post-Delgamuukw
Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title" in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5, 102 at 104-8.
76 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77 As we have seen, that was the interpretation given to those words by the lower courts
in the Bear Island case: see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. However, it is not at all
clear that by "Sovereign" Watson L.J. meant the Crown in its executive capacity, as he could just
as well have meant the Crown in Parliament: see Mathias v. Findlay, [1978] 4 W.W.R. 653 at
656, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 239 at 241 (B.C.S.C.), where Berger J. said that the words "dependent upon
the good will of the Sovereign" simply asserted "what was never in dispute, that is, that Indian
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of what we now know about the source and nature of Aboriginal title.
In St. Catherine's, Lord Watson said that the terms of the Royal Proclamation
show that the "tenure of the Indians was ... dependent upon the good will of the
Sovereign.""8 He then pointed out that "it is declared [by the Proclamation] to be the will
and pleasure of the sovereign that, 'for the present', they [unceded Indian lands] shall be
reserved for the use of the Indians."'79 Evidently he thought that, as Aboriginal title
depended on the Royal Proclamation, the sovereign could change its mind and revoke
the interest that it had conferred on the Indian nations."0 However, given that we now
know that the source of Aboriginal title is not the Royal Proclamation, any power that
the Crown may have had to revoke the Proclamation's reservation of lands could not be
used to extinguish the Aboriginal title that is recognized by the common law.
Even more importantly, because the Supreme Court has said that Aboriginal
title is a legal interest in land that is proprietary in nature, it must enjoy the same
protection as other property against executive extinguishment by the Crown. Aboriginal
title would only be subject to the pleasure of the Crown if it were a bare licence to
occupy Crown land.8' As we have seen, inDelgamuukw Chief Justice Lamer explicitly
rejected the notion that Aboriginal title is a non-proprietary licence. 2 It follows that
Aboriginal title, like other property rights, a could only be unilaterally extinguished by
or pursuant to clear and plain legislation. This is exactly what Hall J. said in his
dissenting opinion in Calder." Since that case was decided, Hall J.'s opinion has been
accepted by the Supreme Court. In both Sparrow5 and Delgamuukw,"6 the Court
affirmed that any extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, including title, requires clear and
plain legislative intent.
In one respect, however, the Supreme Court seems to have modified the
title could be extinguished by competent legislative authority" [emphasis added]. Berger J.'s
interpretation is, in fact, more consistent with the Privy Council's decision that Aboriginal title
is "an interest other than that of the Province" in the land, within the meaning of s. 109 of the
Constitution Act, 1867:St. Catherine's, supra note 48 at 58. See also H. Foster, "Aboriginal Title
and theProvincial Obligation to Respect It: IsDelgamuukw v. British Columbia 'Invented Law'?"
(1998) 56 The Advocate 221.
78 St. Catherine's, supra note 48 at 54.
79 Ibid. at 54-55.
80 Whether Watson L.L thought this could be done by the Crown rather than Parliament
is doubtful, however, as Lord Mansfield had held in Campbell v. Hall (1774), Lofft 655, 98 E.R.
1045 (K.B.), that the Crown lost its authority to legislate in the conquered colonies to which the
Proclamation applied because it promised to create legislative assemblies there: for further
discussion, see "Temagami Indian Land Claim", supra note 54 at 200-203.
s "A bare licence, one unsupported by a contract, is fullyrevocable": B. Ziff, Principles
of Property Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2000) at 282.
82 Supra note 74 and accompanying text.
13 Supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
14 Supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
85 Supra note 6 at 1099.
86 Supra note I at para. 180. See also Osoyoos Indian Band, supra note 16 at paras.
40, 56, 67, 84 where Iacobucci J. applied the "clear and plain" test to reserve lands; compare
paras. 172-74, Gonthier J. (dissenting). For further discussion of this test, see S. Dorsett, "'Clear
and Plain Intention': Extinguishment of Native Title in Australia and Canada post-Wik" (1997)
6 Griffith L. Rev. 96.
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position of Hall J. in Calder. As we have seen, Hall J. said that "specific legislation"
would be required to extinguish Aboriginal title." InDelgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer
reiterated the view he had expressed in R. v. Gladstone88 that "the requirement of clear
and plain intent does not, perhaps, require that the Crown 'use language which refers
expressly to its extinguishment of aboriginal rights"'." He added that "the standard is
still quite high."90 The Court in Delgamuukw must have agreed nonetheless with Hall
J. that the pre-Confederation Proclamations and Ordinances relied on by Judson J. did
not have the effect of extinguishing Aboriginal title generally in British Columbia."
Although the Court did not deal with this issue directly, its acceptance of Hall J.'s
position is revealed by Lamer C.J.'s statement that, 'given the existence of aboriginal
title in British Columbia,' the Court had to determine whether the Province had
jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title 'from the time itjoined Confederation in 1871'
until Aboriginal rights were entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.92 It
would obviously have been unnecessary for the Court to address this issue if it thought
that Aboriginal title had been generally extinguished prior to British Columbia joining
Canada.93
In conclusion, Aboriginal title is a proprietary right that, prior to April 17, 1982,
could have been unilaterally extinguished only by or pursuant to constitutionally valid
legislation. We now have to consider what legislative bodies would have had the
authority to enact legislation that could either extinguish or authorize the extinguishment
of Aboriginal title in Canada. We need to consider this matter first in the pre-
Confederation colonial period, and then in the period after Confederation.
C. Legislative Authority to Extinguish Aboriginal Title Before
Confederation
87 Supra note 61 and accompanying text.
88 Supra note 6 at para. 34.
89 Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 180. Lamer C.J.'s reference to "the Crown" in
this passage is unfortunate, as it perpetuates the untenable belief that the Crown acting executively
could extinguish Aboriginal rights, including title. He may, however, have used the term in
Gladstone because the accused in that case had been charged with a violation of fishery
regulations that were in fact made by the Governor in Council, acting under delegated legislative
authority conferred on it by the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.F-14, s. 43. In any case, it is clear
from the context of his discussion on this matter in Delgamuukw that he was referring to
legislative rather than executive acts, as the issue addressed by him was whether provincial "laws"
could exhibit a sufficiently clear and plain intention to extinguish Aboriginal title without being
ultra vires. (As discussed below, he held that they could not, infra notes 133-42 and
accompanying text).
9 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 180.
9 Supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
92 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 4.
9 The issue of pre-Confederation extinguishment, on which the Supreme Court had
split evenly in Calder, supra note 55, was addressed both at trial and in the Court of Appeal in
Delgamuukw: see Delgamuukw (B.C.S.C.), supra note 51 McEachem C.J., holding that
extinguishment had occurred, rev'd (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 at 525-31, 595, 673-79,753-54,
[1993] 5 W.W.R. 97 at 158-64, 227-28, 305-11, 386-87 (B.C.C.A.), Macfarlane, Wallace,
Lambert, and Hutcheon JJ.A. respectively, unanimously rejecting the view that the Proclamations
and Ordinances referred to in Calder had extinguished Aboriginal title.
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1. The Imperial Parliament
Once the Crown acquired sovereignty over territory in North America, there
seems to be little doubt that, from the perspective of British Imperial law, the Parliament
at Westminster would have had authority to legislate there. 94 There are many examples
of this in Canada, including the Quebec Act, 1774, 9' the Constitution Act, 1867,96 and
most recently the Canada Act 1982.'7 While some Aboriginal people would no doubt
dispute this,98 from the perspective ofImperial law the legislative authority ofParliament
would have included authority to legislate in relation to the rights of the Aboriginal
peoples, including their land rights.99 It follows that, at least until enactment of the
Statute of Westminster, 1931,111 the Imperial Parliament could have extinguished
Aboriginal title in Canada.
As the Imperial Parliament's authority to legislate for a territory must depend
upon that territory being part of the Crown's dominions,"' it would of course be
necessary to determine the date of Crown acquisition of sovereignty in order to know
when Parliament acquired its legislative authority. While the issue of acquisition of
sovereignty cannot be discussed here, it should be noted that courts in Canada have
tended to accept Crown assertions of sovereignty without examining the substantive basis
4 See Campbell v. Hall, supra note 80 at 741; Sir K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth
and Colonial Law (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) at 139-40; B. Slattery, "The
Independence of Canada" (1983) 5 Supreme Court L.R. 369 at 384-90 [hereinafter
"Independence"]. Note, however, that this was hotly disputed in the American Colonies, where
the assertion of legislative authority by Parliament was one of the causes of the Revolution: see
C.H. MeIlwain, TheAmerican Revolution:A ConstitutionalInterpretation, rev. ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1958). Note as well that, in the parts of North America acquired from
France by the 1763 Treaty of Paris, the British Crown had legislative authority concurrent with
that of Parliament for a few months, but that authority was lost when it issued the Royal
Proclamation of 1763: see supra note 80 and infra note 115.
9' (U.K.), 14 Geo. III, c.83.
96 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3.
' 1982 (U.K.), c. 11. By this legislation, the Imperial Parliament effectively renounced
any further authority over Canada: see Indian Association of Alberta, supra note 35 at 98;
"Independence", supra note 94.
98 See e.g.T. Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Don
Mills: Oxford University Press, 1999); P.A. Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward: Dreaming
First Nations'Independence (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1999).
99 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is an obvious example of this. Its validity
is at least implicit in the decision of the Court of Appeal of England in Indian Association of
Alberta, supra note 35 at 99. For the political context surrounding this important case, see D.E.
Sanders, "The Indian Lobby" in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds., And No One Cheered:
Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 301. As s. 35
provides positive constitutional protection to Aboriginal rights, it is probably not in the interests
of Aboriginal peoples to challenge its validity.
"o (U.K.), 22 Geo. V, c.4. In s. 4 of this statute, the Imperial Parliament renounced
authority to legislate for the Dominions, including the Dominion of Canada, with certain
exceptions that included repeal and amendment of the British North America Acts (now the
Constitution Acts), 1867 to 1930. On the impact of this statute, see "Independence", supra note
94 at 390-92.
I See "Independence", ibid. at 3 85-89.
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for the Crown's claims. To give just one example, the Crown has been held to have
acquired sovereignty over Rupert's Land either before or at the time of the Royal Charter
granted to the Hudson's Bay Company by Charles II in 1670, even though English
occupation and control of that vast territory was almost entirely lacking at the time; 2
indeed, apart from what they learned from a few voyages of "discovery" into Hudson
Bay, in 1670 the English did not have any knowledge of the geography or even the extent
of the claimed territory. 3 In virtually all of Canada, Crown assertions of sovereignty
therefore need to be re-evaluated by examining both the legal and the factual basis for
the Crown's claims.'
While the Imperial Parliament's authority to extinguish Aboriginal title after
Crown acquisition of sovereignty must be acknowledged, exercise of that authority is
another matter. In the absence of Imperial legislation that would have had that effect,0 5
the existence of the authority would have no impact on Aboriginal title. And given that
the Imperial Parliament renounced legislative authority over Canada in 1931 and 1982,'°6
the matter may be of more interest today to constitutional historians than to persons
concerned with the existence of Aboriginal title.
2. Colonial Legislative Bodies
As the Imperial Parliament was generally unfamiliar with the conditions in the
colonies and could not concern itself with the details of local colonial law, the usual
practice was for Parliament to delegate legislative authority to colonial governors and
other bodies such as legislative councils and elected assemblies. For example, the
Quebec Act of 1774 provided for the appointment of a council that was given the "Power
and Authority to make Ordinances for the Peace, Welfare, and good Government, of the
said Province, with the Consent of his Majesty's Governor"." 7 In 1791, the
Constitutional Act provided for the division of Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada,
and for the creation of an appointed legislative council and an elected assembly in each
"to make Laws for the Peace, Welfare, and good Government".0 8
In regard to each colony, the first question that has to be asked is whether the
legislative authority that was delegated to the local legislative body included authority
102 See Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern Development,
[1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 193 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Hamlet of Baker Lake cited
to C.N.L.R.], where Mahoney J. held that the 1670 Charter granted the Company "ownership of
the entire colony" (ibid. at 63) including the area around Baker Lake, even though the facts
revealed that the first English penetration into that area did not occur until 1762 (ibid. at 26).
103 See K. McNeil, Native Rights and the Boundaries ofRupert's Land and the North-
Western Territory (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982) especially
at 6-7.
"10 See e.g. K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Nations and Quebec's Boundaries: Canada
Couldn't Give What It Didn't Have" in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5 at 1; K. McNeil,
"Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Nations of Rupert's Land" (1999) 37(1) Manitoba History 2.
' In Chippewas of Sarnia (C.A.), it was argued without success that the Nullum
Tempus Act (U.K.), 9 Geo. III, c. 16, had the effect of extinguishing the Chippewas' title: supra
note 9, see infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. See also infra note 161.
"06 Supra notes 97, 100.
107 (U.K.), 14 Geo. III, c.83, s. 12.
101 (U.K.), 31 Geo. III, c.3 1, s. 2.
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to extinguish Aboriginal title within the territorial limits of the colony. In Calder, the
Supreme Court of Canada split evenly on this question in relation to the Colony of
British Columbia."° Without addressing the question directly, Judson J. was obviously
of the view that the Governor and Legislative Council had this authority because, as
previously noted, he agreed with the conclusion of the lower courts that a series of
Proclamations and Ordinances in relation to land had extinguished Aboriginal title prior
to the entry ofBritish Columbia into Confederation. 1 ' Hall J. disagreed. In his opinion,
as neither the Governor's Commission nor his instructions contained
any power or authorization to extinguish the Indian title, then it follows
logically that if any attempt was made to extinguish the title it was beyond the
power of the Governor or of the Council to do so and, therefore, ultra
vires. 111
The issue was not dealt with in the Delgamuukw case, as the Court of Appeal held that
the Proclamations and Ordinances did not extinguish Aboriginal title, and the Supreme
Court apparently accepted that conclusion."' For this reason, it is probably no longer
necessary to determine whether the Governor and Council had the authority to extinguish
Aboriginal title in British Columbia.
In Eastern Canada, where pre-Confederation colonial bodies had legislative
authority for much longer periods of time than in British Columbia, the matter is
complicated by the Royal Proclamation of 1763."' Among other things, that instrument
prohibited governors of the Crown's North American colonies from granting warrants
of survey or issuing patents for unceded Indian lands and specified a procedure for
purchase of Indian lands by the Crown. In the parts of Canada that were acquired from
'o Pigeon J., who with the concurrence ofJudson, Martland, and Ritchie JJ. dismissed
the action because the Nisga'a did not get the Lieutenant-Governor's permission to bring the
action, mentioned but did not deal with the issue of legislative authority to extinguish Aboriginal
title: Calder, supra note 55 at 426.
"o Ibid. at 331-34. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. (Davey C.J.
concurred with him on the extinguishment issue) dismissed the argument that the Proclamations
were invalid because they were beyond the Governor's authority: Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia (1971), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64 at 98, 74 W.W.R 481 at 522 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
Calder (B.C.C.A.) cited to D.L.R.]. MacFarlane J.A. said that "[iut is not disputed that the old
Colony of British Columbia had complete legislative jurisdiction to extinguish the so-called
'Indian title': ibid. at 109.
.. Calder, supra note 55 at 413.
... See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. In the Court of Appeal, MacFarlane
J.A. said that he was proceeding on the premise that the Governor and Council had the authority
to extinguish Aboriginal rights: (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 at 526, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97 at 159
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Delgamuukw (B.C.C.A.) cited to D.L.R.]. Lambert J.A., dissenting in
part, recognized the importance of the issue, but said he did not have to deal with it, given his
conclusion that the Proclamations and Ordinances did not extinguish Aboriginal title: ibid. at 677-
78.
"' In Calder, Judson and Hall JJ. disagreed over the application of the Proclamation
in British Columbia, but did not discuss its relevance to the conferral of legislative authority on
the Governor and Council: supra note 55.
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France by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, "' the Proclamation has the status of Imperial
legislation."' This should mean that it could have been amended or repealed only by an
Act of the Imperial Parliament, or by a legislative body empowered to do so by an
Imperial statute." 6 In the territory acquired from France in 1763, it appears that
authority to amend or repeal the Royal Proclamation was not delegated to the governors
or the legislative councils and assemblies of Quebec, Upper and Lower Canada, and the
Province of Canada, at least prior to 1860 because the Imperial government in London
retained control over Indian affairs in those colonies until that time."
17
The Royal Proclamation was, however, partially repealed by the Imperial
Parliament when it enacted the QuebecAct in 1774. In the Chippewas ofSarnia case,' "
the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a 'by the Court' judgment, followed its own decision in
the Bear Island case' where it had held that the provisions of the Proclamation relating
to the surrender of Indian lands had been repealed by the Quebec Act. This is doubtful,
as the Quebec Act was designed to address the grievances of the French Canadians, not
to modify the protections accorded to Indian lands by the Proclamation. 2 ' But even if
the Court of Appeal's opinion on this point is correct, 2 ' the fact that the Imperial
government retained control over Indian affairs in the province of Canada until 1860
probably would have prevented the legislative assembly in the province from enacting
statutes prior to that time that extinguished or authorized the extinguishment of
Aboriginal title.
In the Chippewas of Sarnia case, it was argued that the Aboriginal title of the
"' C. Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series (New York: Oceana Publications, 1969)
at 279.
". This is because it was issued by George III pursuant to the legislative authority that
the Crown had in a conquered or ceded colony before provision was made for a local legislative
assembly or English law was introduced: see Campbell v. Hall, supra note 80. See also R. v.
McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68 at 72; Easterbrook v. The King, [1931] S.C.R. 210 at 217-18, 1
D.L.R. 628 at 634; Calder, supra note 55 at 394-95, Hall J. (dissenting); R. v. Isaac (1976), 13
N.S.R. (2d) 460 at paras. 50 and 130, (1975) 8 C.N.L.C. 493 at paras. 50, 130 (N.S.S.C. (A.D.))
MacKeigan, C.J. and Cooper J.A. respectively; Indian Association ofAlberta, supra note 35 at
91-92.
1I6 This must be what Lord Denning M.R. meant when he said in Indian Association
of Alberta that "the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was equivalent to an entrenched provision in the
Constitution of the colonies in North America" (supra note 35 at 91). Compare Land Rights,
supra note 15 at 315-19.
"' Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 40 R.P.R. (3d)
49 at paras. 344-50, 356-58, 393, 101 O.T.C. I at paras. 344-50, 356-58, 393 (Ont. Sup. Ct.)
[hereinafter Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.) cited to R.P.R.].
". Supra note 9 at paras. 185-219.
".. Bear IslandFoundation (C.A.),supra note 52, aff'd on other grounds by the S.C.C.,
supra note 54.
120 For authority supporting the continuing application of the Proclamation's Indian
provisions, see cases cited supra note 115. See also "Temagami Indian Land Claim", supra note
54 at 196-97.
"2 The Court clearly regarded this aspect of its judgment as obiter dicta, as it held that,
regardless of whether the surrender provisions of the Proclamation were still in force after 1774,
there had been no surrender of the lands in question: Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A), supra note 9 at
para. 219. However, it expressly rejected the contention that this aspect of its decision in the Bear
Island case had been obiter (ibid. at para. 208).
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Chippewas had been extinguished by, among other things, adverse possession of their
lands for statutory limitation periods created by legislation enacted in Canada in 1834
and 1859. Campbell J., the motions judge in the case, held that these statutes could not
apply to Indian lands because Indian rights were "within the exclusive imperial authority
and beyond colonial legislative power."'" He also held that, even if the colonial
legislatures had the power to provide for the extinguishment of Aboriginal title by
adverse possession, the 1834 and 1859 statutes did not evince the clear and plain intent
required for them to apply to Indian lands.' While the Court of Appeal did not deal
with the issue of the legislative authority of the colonial assemblies, it nonetheless
affirmed this aspect of Campbell J.'s decision by agreeing with him that the requisite
intent was lacking. The Court said that Chief Justice Lamer's comments on the clear and
plain test in the Delgamuukw case 24 suggested that "a mere inconsistency between a
statute and an Aboriginal right will not suffice to evidence a clear and plain intention to
extinguish the right."'25 The Court also found the following comments of McLachlin J.
(as she then was) in the Van der Peet case to be "helpful to understand what is required
to meet the 'clear and plain' test":
For legislation or regulation to extinguish an aboriginal right, the intention
to extinguish must be "clear and plain": Sparrow, supra [note 6] at p. 1099.
The Canadian test for extinguishment of aboriginal rights borrows from the
American test, enunciated in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), at
pp. 739-40: "[w]hat is essential [to satisfy the 'clear and plain' test] is clear
evidence that [the government] actually considered the conflict between its
intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty" or right.
26
In summary, to determine whether legislative bodies had the power to
extinguish Aboriginal title in each of the British colonies that were eventually unified to
form the Dominion of Canada, the Imperial statutes and other instruments that delegated
authority to the legislative body in question must be examined. As we have seen in
regard to pre-Confederation Quebec and Canada, this examination must also take into
account Imperial policy in relation to Indian affairs and documents like the Royal
Proclamation of 1763. If one concludes that a local legislative body was accorded the
authority to extinguish Aboriginal title, the next question would be whether that authority
was actually exercised. 27 As the burden of proving extinguishment of Aboriginal title
is on the party so alleging, 2 1 it would be up to that party to identify extinguishing
'2 Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at para. 597.
'2 Ibid. at paras. 594-96. On the clear and plain intent requirement, see supra notes
62, 83-90 and accompanying text.
,24 Supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
' Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 240.
126 Van der Peet, supra note 8 at para. 286 (McLachlin J. was dissenting, but not on this
point), quoted in Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 240.
127 In fact, in both Delgamuukw and Chippewas of Sarnia the Courts of Appeal went
straight to this second question, and by answering it in the negative were able to avoid the first
question: see supra notes 93, 112. See also supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
12 See Calder, supra note 55 at 404, Hall J. (dissenting), adopted in Sparrow, supra
note 6 at 1099.
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legislation and convince the court that it exhibits the requisite clear and plain intent to
extinguish the title. As we have seen, the pre-Confederation legislation in British
Columbia and the Province of Canada that was relied upon in the Delgamuukw and
Chippewas of Sarnia cases was held not to meet the clear and plain test. It is therefore
apparent that it is not going to be easy to establish extinguishment of Aboriginal title in
this way.
D. Legislative Authority to Extinguish Aboriginal Title from
Confederation until 1982
1. The Imperial Parliament
There can be little doubt that the Imperial Parliament's authority to extinguish
Aboriginal title prior to Confederation would have continued thereafter, since the
Parliament at Westminster retained authority to legislate for Canada when it enacted the
Constitution Act, 1867.29 Although the Imperial Parliament renounced this authority in
part when it enacted the Statute of Westminster, 193,13 it retained the power to amend
Canada's Constitution until it enacted the Canada Act 1982.3 However, instead of
utilizing this legislative authority to extinguish Aboriginal title, the Imperial Parliament
(on Canada's instructions) used it to entrench Aboriginal and treaty rights in the
Constitution of Canada.132 As a result, we need not concern ourselves further with the
power of the Imperial Parliament to extinguish Aboriginal title.
2. Provincial Legislatures
When the Constitution Act, 1867, divided legislative powers between the
Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures, section 91(24) gave the Canadian
Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians". In
the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the impact of this
conferral ofjurisdiction on Canada, and concluded that it meant that the provinces have
never had the power to extinguish Aboriginal title. Chief Justice Lamer discussed the
matter by posing three specific questions, each of which he answered in the negative.
First, the Chief Justice asked whether British Columbia, and thus the other
provinces, had primary jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title by enacting laws for
that purpose. He concluded that they did not, as Aboriginal title lands are "Lands
reserved for the Indians", over which Parliament received exclusive authority at the time
of Confederation. He based this conclusion on the St. Catherine's decision, where Lord
Watson had said that the words of section 91(24) were, "... according to their natural
meaning, sufficient to include all lands reserved, upon any terms or conditions, for Indian
29 Supra note 96. See "Independence", supra note 94 at 384-90; P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at §3. 1.
130 (U.K.), 22 Geo. V, c.4.
13 Supra note 97.
132 ConstitutionalAct, 1982, supra note 4 at s. 35: see text accompanying supra notes
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occupation."'33 Moreover, Lamer C.J. agreed with the British Columbia Court ofAppeal
that "... separating federal jurisdiction over Indians from jurisdiction over their lands
would have a most unfortunate result- the government vested with primary constitutional
responsibility for securing the welfare of Canada's aboriginal peoples would find itself
unable to safeguard one of the most central of native interests - their interest in their
lands."
13 4
Second, Lamer C.J. asked whether British Columbia had the power to
extinguish Aboriginal title by laws of general application that "... were not in pith and
substance aimed at the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights".'35 Although he said that
provincial laws of general application can apply to Indians and Indian lands,136 they
cannot have the effect of extinguishing Aboriginal rights for two reasons. First of all, to
extinguish Aboriginal rights, provincial laws would have to exhibit a clear and plain
intention to do so. In Lamer's view,
... the only laws with the sufficiently clear and plain intention to extinguish
aboriginal rights would be laws in relation to Indians and Indian lands. As
a result, a provincial law could never, proprio vigore, extinguish aboriginal
rights, because the intention to do so would take the law outside provincial
jurisdiction. 37
The Chief Justice's second reason fortified this by placing Aboriginal rights within the
core of federal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands, where they are protected
against provincial extinguishment by the doctrine ofinterjurisdictional immunity.3 ' As
a result, he said that, even prior to being recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, "... they could not be extinguished by provincial laws of general
application."'
139
Third, Lamer C.J. questioned "whether a provincial law, which could otherwise
not extinguish aboriginal rights, [could] be given that effect through referential
incorporation by s. 88 of the Indian Act."'"4 Again, he held that it could not because
... s. 88 does not evince the requisite clear and plain intent to extinguish
131 St. Catherine's, supra note 48 at 59; quoted in Delgamuukw, supra note I at para.
174.
134 Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 172.
135 Ibid.
136 See articles cited in supra note 7 for a critical commentary on the application of
provincial laws to Aboriginal title lands.
137 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 180.
138 Where this doctrine applies, provincial laws have to be read down to protect the core
of federal jurisdiction, regardless of whether Parliament has occupied the field: see Hogg, supra
note 129 at §§15.8, 27.2(c).
139 Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 181.
40 Ibid. at para. 172. S. 88 ofthe Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, provides: "Subject to
the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general application from time
to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except
to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law
made thereunder, and except to the extent that those laws make provision for any matter for which
provision is made by or under this Act."
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aboriginal rights.... I see nothing in the language ofthe provision which even
suggests the intention to extinguish aboriginal rights. Indeed, the explicit
reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that the provision was clearly not
intended to undermine aboriginal rights.1
4 1
The Delgamuukw decision is, therefore, conclusive authority that, since
Confederation, provincial legislatures have had no jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal
title. Moreover, the referential incorporation by Parliament of certain provincial laws
of general application, by section 88 of the Indian Act, does not include laws that could
extinguish Aboriginal title.
42
3. The Canadian Parliament
As we have seen, section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gave the
Parliament of Canada exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians". It could be argued that, prior to the Statute of Westminster, 1931, this
jurisdiction was subject to the Indian provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 4
Be that as it may, it seems clear as a matter of Canadian constitutional law that, from at
least 1931 until 1982, the Canadian Parliament had the power to extinguish or authorize
the extinguishment of Aboriginal title by legislation. In a number of cases decided by
the Supreme Court before the enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it
"' Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 183. For recent commentary on s. 88, especially
regarding its non-application to Aboriginal title lands, see K. Wilkins, "'Still Crazy After All
These Years': Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458; K. McNeil,
"Aboriginal Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act" (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159.
142 The Supreme Court was unanimous on these points, as La Forest J., in his concurring
judgment, agreed expressly with the Chief Justice's treatment of the extinguishment issue:
Delgamuukwv, supra note I at para. 206. Consistent with this, the motions judge in Chippewas
ofSarnia (Sup. Ct.), held that provincial statutes of limitation cannot apply to Aboriginal title land
that has become an Indian reserve, either of their own force or by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act:
supra note 117 at paras. 476-95. There was no appeal from this aspect of his decision: Chippewas
of Sarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at paras. 222-23. See also Stoney Creek Indian Band v. British
Columbia, [1999] 8 W.W.R. 709, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 192 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Stoney Creek
Indian Band (S.C.)], where Lysyk J. came to the same conclusion (this decision was overturned
on appeal for procedural rather than substantive reasons: Stoney Creek Indian Band v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd. (1999), 179 D.L.R. (4
t
b) 57, [2000] 2 C.N.L.R. 345 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Stoney
Creek Indian Band (C.A.)], leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. iv, [1999]
S.C.C.A. No. 539, online: QL (SCJ). A similar issue was also present in Skeetchestn Indian Band
v. British Columbia (Registrar of Land Titles), where the Court upheld the decision of the
Registrar of Land Titles not to register a certificate of pending litigation, because the litigation
involved Aboriginal title, which the Court held not to be a registrable estate or interest under the
Land TitlesAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.250: [2000] 10 W.W.R. 22, [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 3 10 (B.C.C.A.).
However, the Court took the position that an appeal from a decision of the Registrar was not the
place to decide the broader constitutional issues arising where land subject to an Aboriginal title
claim had been granted in fee simple by the provincial Crown and respecting which a certificate
of indefeasible title had been issued under provincial legislation.
"I See B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727
at 774-75. Of course this depends in part on whether the Proclamation's surrender provisions
were repealed by the Quebec Act: see supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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was held that both treaty and Aboriginal rights can be infringed or extinguished by
federal legislation.' This was confirmed by Delgamuukw, where Lamer C.J. held that
section 91(24) "... encompasses within it the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal
rights, including aboriginal title."'45
Any federal legislative extinguishment of Aboriginal title would have to meet
the clear and plain intent test. 146 As we have seen, in Delgamuukw Lamer C.J., while
affirming his observation in Gladstone that express reference to extinguishment of
Aboriginal rights is perhaps not required, said that "... the standard is still quite high."'
147
We have also seen that the pre-Confederation legislation alleged to have extinguished
Aboriginal title in British Columbia was held in Delgamuukw not to have done so.
148
Moreover, section 88 of the Indian Act was held not to have authorized extinguishment
of Aboriginal title by referential incorporation of provincial laws. 149  Evidently,
establishing extinguishment by federal legislation is no easy task. 5 ° As McLachlin J. (as
she then was) suggested in herjudgment in Van der Peet,5' Parliament must have at least
considered the impact on Aboriginal rights for its legislation to have the effect of
extinguishing them.'52
Apart from legislation implementing land claims agreements, I am not aware
of any federal statutes that were expressly intended to extinguish Aboriginal title. It has
been alleged, however, that statutes of limitation that operate as federal legislation can
have that effect. Two categories of statutes have been relied upon in this context:
limitation Acts enacted either by the British Parliament or by pre-Confederation colonial
assemblies that continued to apply in Canada after Confederation; and federal statutes
that have adopted provincial limitation periods. Each ofthese will be considered in turn.
The Nullum Tempus Act,' enacted by the British Parliament in 1769, barred
claims by the Crown and conferred a statutory title on adverse possessors of Crown lands
' See Sikyea v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 642, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80; R. v. George,
[1966] S.C.R. 267, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386; Daniels v. White and the Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 2
D.L.R. (3d) 1; R. v. Derriksan (1976),71 D.L.R. (3d) 159, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 480 (S.C.C.); Kruger
et al. v. The Queen, [ 1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 at 116, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434 at 442-43. However, it may
be that none of these cases involved extinguishment: see Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra
note 117 at para. 603, where Sikyea and George were both described as "cases of infringement
rather than extinguishment". As we have seen, the distinction between these has become
especially important since s. 35 was enacted: see text accompanying supra notes 4-10.
141 Supra note I atpara. 173. See also Calder, supra note 55; Van derPeet, supra note
8 at para. 28; Mitchell v. M.N.R., supra note 8; Chippewas ofSarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117
at paras. 539-45. Of course, this power was curtailed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982: see
supra note 8 and accompanying text; Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 238.
146 See supra notes 62, 83-90, 123-26, and accompanying text.
147 Supra note 1 at para. 180: see text accompanying supra notes 88-90.
148 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
149 See text accompanying supra notes 140-41. See also Stoney Creek Indian Band
(S.C.), supra note 142 at paras. 27-47; Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at paras.
482-95.
,S' Recall too that the burden of proving the requisite clear and plain intent is on the
party alleging extinguishment: see text accompanying supra notes 62, 128.
"I Supra note 8 at para. 286 (dissenting on other grounds).
152 See text accompanying supra note 126.
"I Supra note 105.
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after 60 years.5 4 In the Chippewas ofSarnia case, it was argued that this statute applied
to bar the claim by the Chippewas of Sarnia First Nation for a declaration of their
Aboriginal title to lands that had been in the possession of private persons for about 140
years. Although it has been held that this statute applies in Canada to the extent that it
has not been superseded by local legislation, 5 ' the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Chippewas of Sarnia decided that it can have no application to an action brought by a
First Nation rather than the Crown. 6
In the Chippewas of Sarnia case, it was also argued that statutes of limitation
enacted by colonial assemblies in Canada prior to Confederation were continued as
federal law by section 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867,' 7 to the extent that they related
to matters under federal jurisdiction, which includes "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians". Campbell J. accepted that section 129 had the effect of continuing the relevant
statutes of limitation, ' which had been enacted by the legislatures of Upper Canada and
the Province of Canada in 1834 and 1859,' but rejected the assertion that these statutes
applied to Indian lands. In his opinion, the statutes did not meet the clear and plain intent
requirement, because they did not evince "... the specific intent necessary or indeed any
intent whatsoever to affect or to extinguish the aboriginal title or treaty rights of the
plaintiffs in the disputed land."'" The Court of Appeal agreed.
161
The second group of statutes that have been alleged to cause extinguishment of
Aboriginal title, through the exercise of federal jurisdiction, are statutes that referentially
incorporate provincial limitation periods. For example, section 39(1) of the Federal
Court Act 162 provides:
154 See K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at
88-89.
'5 See Hamilton v. The King (1917), 54 S.C.R. 331, 35 D.L.R. 226.
156 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 235. For the same reason, the
Court found the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, as am. by S.C. 1990,
c.8, to be inapplicable: Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), ibid. at paras. 230-32.
117 S. 129 provides that the laws and courts in existence in the provinces at the time of
Confederation were to continue, subject "to be repealed, abolished, or altered by the Parliament
of Canada, or by the Legislature of the respective Province, according to the Authority of the
Parliament or of that Legislature under this Act": supra note 34.
s8 He relied upon Mastini v. Bell Telephone (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 215, 1 C.P.R. (2d)
1 (Ex. Ct.).
... An Act to amend the Law respecting Real Property, and to render the proceedings
for recovering possession thereof in certain cases, less difficult and expensive, 4 Will. IV, c. 1; An
Act respecting the limitation of Actions and Suits relating to Real Property, and the time of
prescription in certain cases, C.S.U.C. 1859, c.88.
"6 Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at para. 596.
161 Chippewas of Sarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 241. See also Stoney Creek
Indian Band (C.A.), where Southin J.A. suggested that the English Limitation Act, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16,
might apply to an action for trespass on Indian reserve lands in British Columbia: supra note 142
at para. 15. However, if statutes of limitation enacted in Canada in 1834 and 1859 did not exhibit
the requisite clear and plain intent to extinguish Aboriginal rights, one may wonder how an
English statute enacted long before British Columbia became a Crown colony could do so
(assuming that there were Aboriginal rights to the reserve in question in the Stoney Creek case,
as there were in Chippewas of Sarnia).
162 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
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Except as expressly provided by any other Act, the laws relating to
prescription and the limitation of actions in force in any province between
subject and subject apply to any proceedings in the Court in respect of any
cause of action arising in that province.
163
In the Chippewas of Sarnia case, Campbell J. held that this provision applies only to
proceedings in the Federal Court, not to actions commenced in provincial courts."6 That
ruling is so obviously correct that it was not disputed on appeal.165 However, even if the
action had been in the Federal Court, one would have to ask whether section 39(1)
displays the requisite clear and plain intent to apply to an Aboriginal title claim.
Although the section was applied in Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada
(Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development),16 6 that case involved a
breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligations, not an extinguishment of Aboriginal title.
As the Ontario Court of Appeal said in Chippewas of Sarnia, when referring to the
Blueberry River case, "different considerations apply where it is contended that the
statute itself extinguished the Aboriginal or treaty right."'167 As we have seen, the Court
applied the clear and plain intent test to the limitation statutes under consideration in the
Chippewas of Sarnia case, and found that they did not meet the test.161
IV. JUDICIAL EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE? - THE CHIPPEWAS OF SARNIA
CASE
Our discussion to this point has revealed that it is very difficult to establish
legislative extinguishment of Aboriginal title. No Imperial statutes appear to have done
so, as Imperial policy in North America, from at least the time of the Royal Proclamation
of 1763, was aimed at protecting rather than undermining Aboriginal rights. English
statutes that were received in Canada could not have extinguished Aboriginal title,
because the requisite clear and plain intent was obviously lacking. Colonial assemblies
in British North America, prior to Confederation, probably did not have the authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title, but even if they did, the clear and plain intent test presents
a barrier that parties relying on these statutes have so far been unable to surmount. Since
Confederation, provincial legislatures have been unable to extinguish Aboriginal title,
because it is within the core of exclusive federal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians". Finally, while federal legislation has infringed Aboriginal
rights to hunt and fish,'69 and referential incorporation of provincial limitation periods
163 Another example is the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, which contains a
similar provision in s. 32: supra note 156. As we have seen, in Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.) the
Court of Appeal found this statute to be applicable only to actions involving the federal Crown:
supra notes 9 and 156. In addition, Campbell J. had found that there was no clear and plain
legislative intent for this section to permit the extinguishment of Aboriginal title: Chippewas of
Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at paras. 501-2.
16 ChippewasofSarnia (Sup. Ct.), ibid. at paras. 497-500. See also Canadian Pacific,
supra note 2 at 673; Stoney Creek Indian Band (S.C.), supra note 142 at para. 50.
"6 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 223.
16 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344 at para. 107, 130 D.L.R. (4"') 193 at para. 107, McLachlin J.
11 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 241.
168 See text accompanying supra notes 158-61.
11 See cases cited in supra note 144.
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has barred some claims by Aboriginal peoples, 7 ' there do not appear to be any federal
statutes outside the context of land claims agreements that have been clearly and plainly
intended to extinguish Aboriginal title. This consistent absence of legislative intent to
extinguish Aboriginal title is entirely consistent with what La Forest J. in Mitchell v.
Peguis Indian Band described as
... an obligation to native peoples which the Crown has recognized at least
since the signing of the Royal Proclamation in 1763. From that time on, the
Crown has always acknowledged that it is honour-bound to shield Indians
from any efforts by non-natives to dispossess Indians of the property which
they hold qua Indians, i.e., their land base and their chattels on that land
base.
171
In the Chippewas of Sarnia case, Campbell J. and the Court of Appeal both
accepted that the Chippewas' Aboriginal title, which had been confirmed by Treaty 29
in 1827, had not been extinguished by voluntary surrender orby statute, the two accepted
means by which Aboriginal title could be legally extinguished prior to 1982. The judges
were, nonetheless, faced with the fact that non-Aboriginal persons, who were the
successors in title of the person to whom the claimed lands had been granted by the
Crown in 1853, had been in peaceful and innocent possession for about 140 years.'72
Campbell J. and the Court of Appeal both resolved this dilemma by upholding the titles
of the non-Aboriginal possessors, and relegating the claims of the Chippewas to potential
damages claims against the Crown. However, the routes they took to arrive at this result
were not the same.
After determining that the Chippewas had not surrendered the disputed lands, 1
73
Campbell J. considered the validity of the 1853 patent by which Lord Elgin, the
Governor General of Canada, had purported to grant the lands to Malcolm Cameron, a
politician and land speculator. Campbell J. summarized his conclusions regarding the
validity of the 1853 patent in these terms:
170 See text accompanying supra notes 162-67.
..' Supra note 26 at 13 1. The Mitchell case involved property on reserves, but in so far
as real property is concerned the Indian interest in Aboriginal title and reserve lands has been held
to be the same: Guerin, supra note 64 at 379, Dickson J.; Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 120,
Lamer C.J. In his recent decision in Osoyoos Indian Band, lacobucci J. said in reference to this
holding that "[a]Ithough the two interests are not identical, they are fundamentally similar": supra
note 16 at para. 41. Gonthier J., dissenting, offered a different opinion (ibid. at paras. 158-70).
"7 The lands consist of 2,540 acres, most of which are now within the City of Sarnia.
According to the Court of Appeal, "[t]here are over 2000 residences, five schools, five churches
and a number of commercial and industrial properties located on the disputed lands": Chippewas
ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 45.
"7 Note that Campbell J. also held that two orders-in-council authorized by the
Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada in 1840 that purported to approve a sale of the lands by
three Chippewa chiefs to Malcolm Cameron did not extinguish the Chippewas' title: Chippewas
of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at para. 432. The Court of Appeal agreed expressly with
Campbell J. that "the language of the order-in-council was consistent with the Crown's intention
to obtain a surrender at some point in the future", which the Crown failed to do: Chippewas of
Sarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at paras. 121, 185.
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Because he had no statutory authority to patent the disputed lands, because
he had no delegated prerogative authority to grant the patent, because he was
prohibited from doing so by the Royal Proclamation, by the common law of
aboriginal title, by the binding surrender procedures embedded by Crown
practice into the common law, and by Treaty 29, Lord Elgin's patent to
Cameron of the disputed lands was void ab initio and of no force and
effect.
174
Campbell J.'s conclusion regarding the effect of Lord Elgin's lack of authority to grant
unsurrendered Aboriginal title lands is consistent with the principles discussed earlier in
relation to executive authority to interfere with property rights. As we have seen, in the
absence of clear and plain statutory authority, the Crown in its executive capacity cannot
extinguish property rights, whether by grant or other means.'75 As the Chippewas'
interest in their unsurrendered Aboriginal title lands was proprietary,'76 the Governor
General could not have extinguished their Aboriginal title by granting the lands to
Cameron. This is so fundamental that it should be unquestionable.'77
Although Campbell J.'s conclusion that the 1853 patent was void ab initio
meant that Cameron's possession of the disputed lands had been wrongful, Campbell J.
was unwilling to correct this wrong by returning the land to the Chippewas, because this
would have meant dispossessing the innocent persons who traced their titles back to the
patent. He rationalized this outcome by resorting to equitable principles and applying
the good faith purchaser for value without notice rule, combined with a 60-year equitable
limitation period.
The good faith purchaser rule applies where a trustee transfers trust property to
a third party who pays market value without notice, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of the trust. 7 1 When that happens, the purchaser receives good title, and the
equitable interest of the trust beneficiary is destroyed. As the property cannot be
recovered from the good faith purchaser, the beneficiary's only remedy is against the
trustee for breach of trust. This is a specific equitable rule created by the Court of
Chancery to protect innocent purchasers of trust property, who may have no way of
knowing that the trustee's legal title is not a beneficial title. It is in stark contrast to the
common law rule respecting transfers of property, namely nemo dat quod non habet (no
'7' Chippewas ofSarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at para. 431. See also ibid. at para.
400, where Campbell J. observed that "[t]he patent was a pure act of the royal prerogative,
unsupported by any legislation or purported legislative authority."
'7' See text accompanying supra notes 36-47. However, on the basis of the principles
outlined there, I respectfully think Campbell J. was wrong ifhe meant to suggest that the Governor
General's commission and instructions could have delegatedprerogative authority to him to grant
unsurrendered Indian lands (see ibid. at paras. 413-18), as Lord Elgin could have received
authority to do so only by an Act of Parliament.
176 See Delgamuukw, supra note 1, and discussion in "Constitutionally Protected
Property Right", supra note 5.
"7 For extensive judicial authority supporting this principle, and detailed discussion of
its application in Australia, see "Racial Discrimination", supra note 36.
17 See D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1984)
at 983, 1043; P.V. Baker & P. St. J. Langan, Snell'sPrinciples ofEquity, 28th ed. (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1982) at 23-24; J. E. Martin, Hanbury andMartin Modern Equity, 15th ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 18-19, 21, 32-33.
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one can give what he or she does not have).' At common law, a good faith purchaser
for value without notice from a seller whose title is defective only acquires what the
seller has, i.e. a defective title.' Statutory limitation periods aside, there is no bar
preventing the true owner of the property from recovering it from the innocent purchaser
in that situation.'8'
In Chippewas ofSarnia, Campbell J. glossed over this fundamental distinction
between the treatment accorded to good faith purchasers by equity and the common law.
He said that the defence of the good faith purchaser is "[d]eeply embedded in the
principles of common law and equity". 2 Referring to what he called the "highly
technical argument" of counsel for the Chippewas that the good faith purchaser rule
"demonstrates a fundamental distinction between legal estates and equitable interests"," 3
he said:
Nothing is gained, so many years after the merger ofthe administration of law
and equity in one single supreme court of judicature in 1873, in debating
whether equity and law are fused or whether a particular defence, like the
defence of good faith purchaser for value without notice, is a legal or
equitable defence. Nor is it helpful to reach into technical distinctions
between legal estates and equitable interests when applying, to innocent
owners who hold their title in fee simple based on a chain of title over a
hundred and forty years old, the defence of good faith purchaser for value
without notice. It is a valid defence to a claim against land, and a
fundamental principle of our law of real property, whether one calls it a rule
of law or a rule of equity.
184
"' See Ziff, supra note 81 at 412-14; V. Di Castri, The Law of Vendor andPurchaser,
vol. 2, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at §522. Note, however, that where land is concerned
the application of the nemo dat rule has been altered in some jurisdictions by land registry and
torrens system legislation: see Ziff, ibid. at 423-24; R. Megarry & W. Wade, The Law of Real
Property, 6th ed. by C. Harpum (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 87. As this legislation is
provincial in Canada, it cannot apply to extinguish Aboriginal title: see Chippewas ofSarnia (Sup.
Ct.), supra note 117 at paras. 465-81. The Court of Appeal agreed with this aspect of Campbell
J.'s decision: Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 220.
"' There are exceptions to the nemo dat rule, but they are not relevant to the present
discussion, as they relate mainly to personal property: see Ziff, ibid. at412; H. Broom,A Selection
ofLegalMaxims, 8th ed. by J. G. Pease & H. Chitty (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1911) at 624-32;
E.L.G. Tyler &N.E. Palmer, Crossley Vaines'Personal Property, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths,
1973) at 159-207.
"I' This distinction between the equitable good faith purchaser rule and the common law
nemo dat rule is illustrated further by the difference between tracing trust property in equity and
following property in law. See A.H. Oosterhoff& E.E. Gillese, Text, Commentary and Cases on
Trusts, 5th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1998) at 754-57, especially at 756: "Nor is the legal
remedy [of following] barred by a transfer of the property to a bonafide purchaser of the legal
estate for value and without notice, as the equitable remedy [of tracing] is." See also A.H.
Oosterhoff& W.B. Rayner, Anger and Honsberger's Real Property, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Aurora, Ont.:
Canada Law Book, 1985) at 670-71.
182 Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at para. 689 (emphasis added).
.83 Ibid. at para. 737. Compare A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 181; J. Williams, Principles of the Law ofRealProperty, 17th
ed. by T. C. Williams (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1894) at 210-11.
"s Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at para. 738.
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He concluded by saying:
The distinction between legal and equitable interests in land is not relevant
in modem times to the defence of innocent purchaser for value without
notice. The defence extinguishes any ordinary legal or equitable interest in
land.' 85
So "[t]he defence of good faith purchaser for value without notice would extinguish
immediately on purchase in 1861 any ordinary legal or equitable interest in the disputed
lands."
18 6
Because Aboriginal title is not an ordinary interest, but rather "a unique form
of ownership which does not fit the traditional property rights pigeonholes", Campbell
. said that "[o]rdinary property doctrines such as [the] good faith purchaser defence
should not be applied to extinguish aboriginal title unless they can meet the stringent
tests used to measure laws which purport to extinguish aboriginal or treaty rights." '187
Given the unique nature of Aboriginal title and the special protections accorded to it by
Canadian law, he decided that the application of the good faith purchaser rule should be
tempered by combining it with an equitable limitation period, which he said should be
60 years, by analogy to the statutory limitation period on actions by the Crown to recover
land. That 60-year period began on August 26, 1861, when Cameron alienated the last
parcel of the disputed lands to an innocent purchaser, and so the Aboriginal title of the
Chippewas was extinguished on August 26, 1921. In Campbell J.'s view, this approach
achieved an appropriate balance between the interests of the Chippewas and the innocent
purchasers, and so was in keeping with Supreme Court jurisprudence on the need to
promote reconciliation between the Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians.1
8
With all due respect, Campbell J.'s application of the good faith purchaser
defence and his invention of a 60-year equitable limitation period were remarkable
departures from legal principle and precedent. The good faith purchaser rule did not
apply to extinguish legal interests in land in 1861, nor does it do so today. Referring to
the period before the Judicature Act of 1873,' a leading English text on real property
states in emphasized print "the cardinal maxim in which is expressed the true difference
between legal and equitable rights":
Legal rights are good against all the world; equitable rights are good
against all persons except a bonafide purchaser of a legal estate for value
without notice, and those claiming under such a purchaser.19
0
385 Ibid. at para. 739.
386 Ibid. at para. 740 [emphasis added] (1861 was the date by which Cameron had
transferred all ofthe disputed lands to innocent purchasers). This statement reveals that Campbell
. thought the good faith purchaser rule applied to legal interests even before the Judicature Acts
of the 1870s.
' Ibid. at para. 739.
18 Ibid. atparas. 741-69.
189 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66.
19o Megarry & Wade, supra note 179 at 99, relying on F.W. Maitland, Equity: A
Course of Lectures, ed. by A. H. Chaytor & W. . Whittaker, rev. by . Brunyate (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1936) at 114-15.
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The same authors go on to affirm that this fundamental distinction between law and
equity did not change in 1873: "A legal right is still enforceable against a purchaser of
a legal estate without notice, while an equitable right is not."''
As for equitable limitation periods, a court of equity can adopt a statutory
limitation period by analogy and apply it to an equitable claim that is not actually
governed by the statute, but only if there is a close resemblance between the equitable
action and a common law action that is governed by the limitation period.192 That vital
requirement does not appear to have been met here, as the Chippewas' actions for
possession and for damages for trespass were not equitable, nor were there other
comparable common law actions that would have been governed by the 60-year
limitation period against Crown actions. Moreover, it seems as well that equitable
limitation periods are applied in combination with the doctrine of laches,'93 which
Campbell J. found to be inapplicable on the facts.'94
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion as
Campbell J. on the inability of the Chippewas to challenge the titles of the current
possessors of the disputed lands, but for somewhat different reasons. First of all, the
Court of Appeal disagreed with Campbell J.'s conclusion that the patent granted to
Cameron by the Crown in 1853 had been void ab initio. In the Court's view, "a patent
that suffers from a defect that renders it subject to attack will continue to exist and to
have legal effect unless and until a court decides to set it aside."'"5 Moreover, in
deciding whether to set a patent aside, the Court said it has discretion, the exercise of
which depends in part on the conduct of the party seeking to have the patent declared
invalid. It found that this was an appropriate case for it to exercise its discretion not to
set the patent aside, because the Chippewas had accepted and acquiesced for so long in
the invalid sale of the lands to Cameron by three of their chiefs in 1839; the purchase
price had been paid to the Crown in trust for the Chippewas; the patent had been issued
as a result of an inadvertent error, made by a dysfunctional bureaucracy that mistakenly
thought a formal surrender had been obtained; and the patent had been relied on by
innocent third parties for almost 150 years.' 96
'' Ibid. at 103. See also E.H. Bum, Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real
Property, 15th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1994) at 58.
192 See M. (K.) v. M, (H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, 96 D.L.R. (4") 289 [hereinafter M (K.)
cited to S.C.R.]; J. M. Lightwood, The Time Limit on Actions (London: Butterworths, 1909) at
251-52; G.H. Newsom & L. Abel-Smith, Preston and Newsom on Limitation ofActions, 3rd ed.
(London: The Solicitors' Law Stationery Society, 1953) at 261-62; J. S. Williams, Limitation of
Actions in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 38-39.
' See J. Brunyate, Limitation ofActions in Equity (London: Stevens & Sons, 1932)
at 16, quoted with approval by La Forest J. in M (K.): "Thus the substantial difference between
cases where the Court acts in obedience to a Statute of Limitations and cases where it acts by
analogy with the statute is that in the former the limitation is peremptory whereas in the latter it
is but part of the law of laches.": (M(K.), ibid. at 74).
194 Chippewas of Sarnia (Sup. Ct.), supra note 117 at paras. 655-78.
195 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 261.
196 Ibid. at paras. 268-75. Later in their judgment, the Court of Appeal disagreed
expressly with Campbell J. on the application of the doctrines of laches and acquiescence, which
they then used as additional reasons to deny the private law remedies sought by the Chippewas
(ibid. at paras. 297-302). To the extent that the remedies sought by the Chippewas were legal,
however, these equitable doctrines should have had no application: see text accompanying infra
[Vol 33:2
Extinguishment ofAboriginal Title in Canada
The Court of Appeal treated the Chippewas' claim of a right to possession as
including an assertion of a public law remedy that "either directly or by necessary
implication would set aside the Cameron patent."'97 It said the remedy that was formerly
available for this purpose, namely the prerogative writ of scirefacias, has fallen into
disuse and been replaced by an application for judicial review. The modem procedure,
nonetheless, continues to be governed by the "foundational principles" applicable to the
old prerogative writs, one of which "is the discretionary nature of the inherent power of
the superior courts to grant the prerogative writs."'98 The main authority relied upon by
the Court to conclude that scirefacias is discretionary was The Queen v. Hughes, where
Lord Chelmsford stated:
All Charters or grants of the Crown may be repealed or revoked when they
are contrary to law, or uncertain, or injurious to the rights and interests of
third persons, and the appropriate process for the purpose is by writ of Scire
facias. And if the grant or Charter is to the prejudice of any person, he is
entitled as of right to the protection of this prerogative remedy. 199
Commenting on this passage, the Court of Appeal said:
The statement in Hughes, supra, that the writ ofscirefacias issues "as of
right" must be read together with the statement that the purpose ofthe remedy
ofscirefacias is that grants of letters patent "may be repealed or revoked
when they are contrary to law, or uncertain, or injurious to the rights or
interests of third persons." If the patent may be repealed on scirefacias, it
must equally be the case that it may not be repealed or revoked even "when
contrary to law.
The Court, thus, disregarded the fact that Lord Chelmsford had listed three situations
where the writ ofscirefacias is available, and then specified with regard to one of them,
notes 234-43, and M.(K.), supra note 192 at 77, La Forest J., quoting with approval from R.P.
Meagher, W.M.C. Gummow & J.R.F. Lehane, Equity: Doctrines andRemedies, 2nd ed. (Sydney:
Butterworths, 1984) at para. 3601.
9 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 275.
19I bid. at para. 253. The Court placed scirefacias "in the same category as the more
familiar prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus"(ibid at para.
251). However, while certiorari and mandamus were held to be discretionary in Harelkin v.
University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561 at 574-76, 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14 at 40-41, Beetz J., this
does not mean that the other prerogative writs are. Habeas corpus, for example, is so fundamental
to the liberty of the subject that "if a probable ground be shown, that the party is imprisoned
without just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a
writ of right, which 'may not be denied': Blackstone, supra note 37, vol. 3 at 132-33, quoting
Coin. Jour. 1 Apr. 1628. See also Broom, supra note 37 at 223; EshugbayiEleko, supra note 40
especially at 670-71. Moreover, s. 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
ConstitutionalAct, 1982, Pt. I, supra note 4, provides that "[e]veryone has the right on arrest or
detention ... to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be
released if the detention is not lawful."
199 (1865), 1 L.R. (P.C.) 81 at 87-88, quoted in Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note
9 at para. 250.
200 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 254 (C.A.'s emphasis).
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namely where a Crown grant is "to the prejudice of any person", that the writ is
obtainable "as of right". What Lord Chelmsford must have had in mind here were
situations where Crown grants infringe the rights, especially the property rights, of third
persons. Whatever the discretion of a court where a grant is contrary to law or uncertain,
the special protection accorded to property rights by the common law means that where
those rights have been infringed by executive action in the form of a Crown grant, the
remedy ofscirefacias is not discretionary.2"' If it were, courts could use their discretion
to uphold executive taking of property, which is contrary to fundamental common law
principles.2 2
More problematic still is the Court of Appeal's holding that a defective Crown
patent continues to have legal effect until a court decides to set it aside.2 3 This is
contrary to long-standing judicial authority.2" In his report of the Case of Alton Woods,
Sir Edward Coke described numerous situations where patents would be void, including
this example: "if the King be tenant for life, and the King grants the land to another and
his heirs, that grant is void, for the King taketh upon him to grant a greater estate than
201 See The Queen v. Eastern Archipelago Company (1853), 22 L.J.Q.B. (N.S.) 196
(Q.B.), at 213, Lord Campbell C.J.; (1853), 23 L.J.Q.B. (N.S.) 82 (Ex. Ch.) especially at 88-89,
Martin B., and at 106, Jervis C.J.; Blackstone, supra note 37, vol. 3 at 261. Immeubles Port Louis
Lte v. Lafontaine (Village), [1991] I S.C.R. 326, 78 D.L.R. (4th) 175, which was relied on
heavily by the Court of Appeal, is not applicable because it involved municipal by-laws passed
under legislative authority, not executive action. Moreover, Immeubles Port Louis LtDe should
be compared with Tonks v. Reid, where the Supreme Court found a conveyance of land by a
municipality, even though authorized by a by-law, to be void (not voidable) because it was made
in violation of statutory provisions: [1967] S.C.R. 81, (1966), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 310. See also
Boddington v. British Transport Police [1998], 2 W.L.R. 639 at 666, 2 All E.R. 203 at 229, a
recent decision of the House of Lords, where Lord Steyn said: "above all, it must be borne in mind
that 'there are grave objections to giving the courts discretion to decide whether governmental
action is lawful or unlawful' (quoting from William Wade, Administrative Law, 6th ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988) at 354).
202 See text accompanying supra notes 36-42. The Court of Appeal also observed that
"the courts have for long hesitated to invalidate patents that have created third party reliance":
Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 259, citing Boulton v. Jeffrey (1845), 1 E. &
A. 111 (C.A.); Bailey v. Du Cailland, [ 1905] 6 O.W.R. 506 (Div. Ct.) at 508; Fitzpatrick v. The
King (1926), 59 O.L.R. 331 (C.A.) at 342. However, those cases all involved situations where
plaintiffs argued that, because they had been in possession of, or made improvements on, Crown
lands, those lands should have been granted to them rather than to the persons who did receive
patents. None of the plaintiffs had a pre-existing property right that had been infringed by the
Crown grant. The courts accordingly held that, in the absence of evidence that it had been
deceived in its grant, the Crown's discretion to grant its own lands should not be interfered with
by the courts. These cases therefore do not support the existence ofjudicial discretion where
property rights have been infringed by Crown grant.
203 See text accompanying supra note 195. For further critical commentary, see M. D.
Walters, "The Sanctity of Patents: Some Thoughts on the Validity of Crown Patents for Un-
Surrendered Aboriginal Lands" (Pacific Business & Law Institute Conference, Vancouver, 19-20
April 2001).
204 In addition to the cases referred to in the text and notes following this note, see
McLean Gold Mines Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Ontario (1925), 58 Ont. L.R. 64, where the
Ontario Court of Appeal itself held that grants by the Crown of mining patents were void because
the lands were owned by the plaintiff. This decision was reversed on other grounds by the Privy
Council: see infra note 221.
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he lawfully can grant".2"' In Alcock v. Cooke,0 6 Best C.J. came to the same conclusion
with respect to a grant by Charles I in fee simple, which he held to be "altogether void",
because the King had attempted to grant an estate in possession which he did not have,
the land having been previously granted by James I for a term of years that had not yet
expired. 0 7 Likewise, in the case of In the matter ofIslington Market Bill, the House of
Lords unanimously held that a Crown grant of a market "... within the common law
distance of an old market, prima facie is injurious to the old market, and therefore
void".2"' Nor has it ever been necessary in these kinds of situations for a patent to be
declared void on a writ ofscirefacias in order for it to cease to have legal effect. As was
held by Finch C.J. in Sir Oliver Butler's Case, and affirmed by the House of Lords, while
a 'void patent' could be remedied by scirefacias, the person wronged would also have
private law remedies such as "actions [e.g. trespass] upon the case".2 9 An entry upon
201 (1600), 1 Co. R. 40b (K.B.) at 44a. See also Earl of Rutland's Case (1608), 8 Co.
R. 55a (K.B.).
206 (1829), 5 Bing. 340 (C.P.) at 348. This case also reveals that long user by a grantee
of the Crown (over 100 years in this instance) cannot breathe life into an otherwise void patent.
207 Compare Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 294, where the Court
referred to a distinction Best C.J. had made between a pre-existing interest that had been enrolled
and so was of record (as was the case of the leasehold granted by James I), and one that had not
been enrolled. In the former situation, Best C.J. said that the second grant was altogether void,
because the King had been deceived by the grantee, who had the means of knowing of the
existence of the previous grant by examining the rolls. But if the leasehold had been created by
a private person and so was not enrolled, or had been created by an enrolled patent that was
recited in the second patent, the King would not have been deceived. So the second grant would
not necessarily be void. However, it is clear from Best C.J.'sjudgment that the fee simple patent,
even though not void, would still be subject to the pre-existing leasehold interest; as a result, the
fee simple would be a remainder until the lease expired. This was affirmed by Lord Mersey in
City of Vancouver v. Vancouver Lumber Company, [1911] A.C. 711 (P.C.) at 721, where, after
referring to A icock v. Cooke, he said:
The rule is a rule of common law by which a grant by the King which is wholly or in
part inconsistent with a previous grant is held absolutely void unless the previous grant
is recited in it. But the rule is qualified to this extent, that if the subject had no actual
or constructive notice of the previous grant, the second grant will be good to the extent
to which it may be consistent with the first grant though void as to the rest. [Emphasis
added]
Moreover, in Attorney-General for the Isle of Man v. Mylchreest (1879), 4 App. Cas. 294, the
Privy Council decided that the Crown's title, and therefore that of its grantees, to lands on the Isle
of Man was subject to customary rights which obviously had not been created by prior grant and
so were not enrolled: see discussion in "Racial Discrimination", supra note 36 at 376-377. So
while the Court of Appeal was correct when it said in Chippewas of Sarnia that the "nemo dat
principle did not automatically invalidate Crown patents", the principle still prevents the Crown
from infringing or taking away property rights by means of grant: ibid. at para. 295, see also text
accompanying supra notes 179-8 1.
20' (1835), 3 Cl. & F. 513 at 515, Park J.
209 (1681), 2 Ventr. 344 (Ch.) at 344, Finch C.J., affirmed unanimously (1685), 3 Lev.
220 (H.L.). See also Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641, where the House of Lords
found a Crown grant to be ineffective to convey an interest in land without evidence that the land
had been the Crown's at the time of the grant. In this regard, Lord Blackburn said that a Crown
grant had to be treated in the same way as a grant by a private individual (ibid. at 667). The
decision therefore affirmed the application of the nemo dat rule (see supra notes 179-81 and
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land by the grantee of an interest that is not the Crown's to give is an actionable civil
wrong, because the Crown cannot by patent authorize anyone to enter onto the lands of
another.21° Were this not so, the protections against executive interference with property
rights, that have since the Magna Carta been so carefully developed by the common law
courts,2" could be circumvented, because the Crown by grant could effectively take
privately-owned land, forcing the owner to go to court to ask for what the Court of
Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia held to be a discretionary remedy in order to have the
Crown patent set aside. 12 It is in fact vital to the rule of law for violations of property
rights caused by unlawful acts of the Crown to be remediable, not just by prerogative




The Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia was not of the view that private
law remedies are unavailable where the Crown wrongfully grants land that is subject to
Aboriginal title. However, it held that, apart from their damage claims against the
governments of Canada and Ontario, the remedies requested by the Chippewas were
equitable, and therefore discretionary as well.2"4 In particular, the Court held that their
requests for a declaration of their entitlement to possession and a vesting order against
some of the current possessors of the disputed lands involved "remedies that are
discretionary in nature and subject to equitable defences. 2 5 Regarding declaratory
judgments, the Court said that "[i]t is well established, and not disputed before us, that
the remedy of a declaratory judgment is equitable in origin and that its award is subject
to the discretion of the court".216 But, even if this is generally so,217 apparently it is not
accompanying text) to Crown patents.
210 See W. Staunford, An Exposicion of the Kinges Prerogative (London: Richard
Trottel, 1567; reprinted New York: Garland, 1979) at 74a, citing Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, f.25, 24 Edw.
III, f.34.
21 See text accompanying supra notes 36-46.
212 If the patent continued to have legal effect until set aside by a court, it seems that the
landowner's fundamental right to defend his property by self-help would be barred by executive
act: on the use of self-help to defend possession of land and evict trespassers, see F.H. Lawson,
Remedies of English Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972) at 47-48.
213 In Entick, supra note 39, the Court of Common Pleas decisively rejected the
argument that state necessity can justify executive interference with private property rights. The
Court awarded damages for trespass against the defendants, who were officers of the Crown,
because the warrant under which they had entered the plaintiff's house and seized his papers was
unlawful. There was no suggestion that the warrant, which had been issued by the Secretary of
State, was valid until set aside by a court. D.L. Keir & F.H. Lawson, Cases in ConstitutionalLaw,
4th rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) at 170, describe this decision as "perhaps the central
case in English constitutional law."
2,4 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at paras. 278-83.
25 Ibid. at para. 283.
216 Ibid. at para. 279. Among the authorities listed in support of this statement were
Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bankfor Foreign Trade Ltd., [ 1921] 2 A.C.
438 (H.L.); Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [ 1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 481-82, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481
at510-12, Wilson J.; HongKongBankofCanada v. Wheeler Holdings Ltd., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 167
at 189-92, 100 D.L.R. (4th) 40 at 52-55.
27 In addition to the cases cited in supra note 216, see I. Zamir, The Declaratory
Judgment (London: Stevens & Sons, 1962) especially at 183-244; P.W. Young, Declaratory
Orders (Sydney: Butterworths, 1975) especially at paras. 801-19; L. Sama, The Law of
Declaratory Judgments, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) especially at 17-19, 211-13, 215-16.
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always the case. Regarding Aboriginal title in particular, the Supreme Court in Calder
expressly rejected an argument made by counsel for the Nisga'a that their claim for "a
declaration that the aboriginal title, otherwise known as the Indian title, of the plaintiffs
to their ancestral tribal territory hereinbefore described, has never been lawfully
extinguished" involved the "exercise of equitable jurisdiction"."'
As discussed above, in Calder the Supreme Court split three/three on the issue
of whether the Aboriginal title of the Nisga'a had been extinguished by pre-
Confederation legislation.219 Pigeon J., the seventh judge whose judgment was actually
that of the majority,22 avoided this issue entirely by deciding that the courts had no
jurisdiction to hear the case, because permission to sue the Crown had not been obtained
from the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia. Regarding the nature of the action,
Pigeon J. said this:
Concerning the contention that the making ofthe declaration prayed for could
be considered as an exercise of equitablejurisdiction, I must say that Ifail to
see how it could be so and how this could be reconciled with the decision
above referred to. The substance of the claim is that the Crown's title to the
subject land is being questioned, its assertion of an absolute title in fee being
challenged on the basis of an adverse title which is said to be a burden on the
fee.
221
So when the Nisga'a attempted to avoid the common law rule, that the Crown cannot be
sued in its own courts without its permission, by asking the Supreme Court to exercise
its equitable discretion in their favour, the Court refused because it did not regard their
request for a declaration of their title as involving the Court's equitablejurisdiction. But
when the Chippewas asked for a declaration of their unextinguished Aboriginal title,
their request was denied because the Court of Appeal thought that this remedy did
involve the Court's equitable jurisdiction. As this aspect of the Court of Appeal's
decision is difficult to reconcile with the unmentioned majority judgment in Calder, it
can be regarded as having been madeper incuriam.m Moreover, after Aboriginal rights
were recognized and affirmed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,"23 judicial
discretion over Aboriginal title should have become even more objectionable than it was
when Calder was decided in 1973. As Lord Shaw poignantly observed in Scott v. Scott,
"[t]o remit the maintenance of constitutional right to the region ofjudicial discretion is
28 Calder, supra note 55 at 422,425-26, Pigeon J.
219 See text accompanying supra notes 59-63.
220 Judson J., Martland and Ritchie JJ. concurring, agreed with Pigeon J.: Calder, supra
note 55 at 345.
221 Ibid. at 425-26 [emphasis added]. The decision Pigeon J. referred to was Attorney-
Generalfor Ontario v. McLean GoldMines, Ltd., where the Privy Council decided that an action
for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to the lands in question had to be brought by petition of
right, because the Crown's title was being challenged: [1927] A.C. 185, (1926), 59 O.L.R. 415.
2 Theper incuriam doctrine allows other courts to disregard a decision that was made
in ignorance of a relevant statute, judicial precedent, or legal principle: see Halsbury's Laws of
England, supra note 32, 4th ed., vol. 26 (1979) at para. 578, and the authorities listed there.
"3 See text accompanying supra notes 4-5.
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to shift the foundations of freedom from the rock to the sand. 224
In Chippewas ofSarnia, the Court of Appeal used the suigeneris character of
Aboriginal title as an additional justification for applying equitable principles to deny
remedies against the present possessors of the disputed lands. 225 Statements by the
Supreme Court of Canada respecting the legally enforceable nature of Aboriginal title
do not, the Court of Appeal said,
... reflect a rigid classification of Aboriginal title as strictly legal in nature,
immune from the principles of equity. Rights of equitable origin are every bit
as legally enforceable as rights of common law origin. By insisting that
Aboriginal title is legally enforceable, the Supreme Court of Canada did not,
in our view, intend to classify Aboriginal title in terms more relevant to the
19th century, pre-Judicature Act, pre-fusion of law and equity phase of our
legal development.
226
Unfortunately, this part of the Court of Appeal's judgment reveals the same kind of
confusion over the impact of the Judicature Acts as the judgment of Campbell j.227 The
statement that "[r]ights of equitable origin are every bit as legally enforceable as rights
of common law origin" ignores the most fundamental distinction between them, namely
that the good faith purchaser for value without notice rule applies only to equitable rights
- it has never applied to common law rights.2 8 This mistake led the Court of Appeal to
apply the good faith purchaser rule in much the same way as Campbell J. had done, with
this difference: the Court of Appeal did not accept that the application of this rule could
be tempered by a 60-year equitable limitation period.229 Apart from that, the Court's
application of the rule to Aboriginal title land is subject to the same criticisms and, with
all due respect, is as incorrect as this aspect of Campbell J.'s judgment.23 In the
Delgamuukw case, Lamer C.J. affirmed the unanimous holding of the Supreme Court in
Canadian Pacific v. Paul that Aboriginal title is a proprietary interest in land that can
"compete on an equalfooting with other proprietary interests"."3 Clearly this would not
be so if claims to Aboriginal title were subject to equitable defences that do not apply to
224 [1913] A.C. 417 at 477, [1911-1913] All E.R. I at 80 (H.L.) [hereinafter Scott cited
to A.C.]. See also Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 740-43, 19 D.L.R. (4th)
1 at 16-18, where the Supreme Court held, for the same kind of reasons, that the
mandatory/directory distinction does not apply to constitutional provisions (this distinction allows
a court to uphold governmental action that did not comply with statutory requirements by finding
those requirements to be directory rather than mandatory). On the common law connection
between protection of property rights and freedom, see the quotation from Harrison v. Carswell,
supra note 37, in text accompanying infra note 240.
"' Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at paras. 284-9 1.
226 Ibid. at para. 285.
227 See text accompanying supra notes 178-86.
228 See text accompanying supra notes 189-91.
229 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at paras. 297-302.
o For further support for this conclusion, see J. I. Reynolds, "The Chippewas ofSarnia
Band v. Canada - A Most Inequitable Decision" 81 Can. Bar. Rev. [forthcoming in 2002].
2" Delgamuukw, supra note 1 atpara. 113, citing Canadian Pacific, supra note 2 at 677
[emphasis added].
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common law interests in land.232 As Pigeon J. stated in the passage from Calder quoted
above, the substance of a claim to Aboriginal title is an interest in land, adverse to that
of other claimants (in that case, the Crown), and so a request for a declaration of
Aboriginal title involves property rights that are not subject to a court's equitable
jurisdiction. 3
But even if the Court of Appeal was correct in deciding that the Chippewas'
requests for declaratory relief and a vesting order did involve discretionary equitable
remedies," there is an additional problem with this aspect of their judgment: these were
not the only remedies that the Chippewas sought against the current possessors of the
disputed lands. They also asked for writs ofpossession and damages for trespass against
three of the corporate defendants, namely the Canadian National Railway Company,
Dow Chemical Canada Incorporated, and Imperial Oil Limited.235 Actions for
possession of land and for trespass are common law actions involving common law
remedies that are fundamental to the protection of real property rights.236 Unlike
232 Moreover, it has been authoritatively decided that Aboriginal title and reserve lands
(the Aboriginal interest in both is the same: see supra note 171) are not held in trust. In St.
Catherine's Milling, Lord Watson held that Indian title is an interest in land within the meaning
of s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, thereby implicitly deciding that it is not held in trust (s.
109 made provincial title to Crown lands "subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and
to any Interest other than that of the Province in the same"): supra note 48 at 58. In Guerin, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that reserve lands are held in trust (Wilson J.,
however, thought a trust would be created when reserve lands are surrendered for the purpose of
being leased): supra note 64 at 353-55, Wilson J., and at 386, Dickson J. Given that Aboriginal
title and reserve lands are not held in trust, the Aboriginal interest in them should not be defeasible
by the application of a rule created to protect innocent purchasers of trust property.
213 See text accompanying supra note 221.
234 In Cheslatta Carrier Nation v. British Columbia, Newbury J.A. upheld a decision
of Lysyk J. striking a claim for a declaration of an Aboriginal fishing right on the grounds that no
allegation of infringement of that right had been made and so there was no dispute for the Court
to resolve: [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 10, (2000), 143 B.C.A.C. 248 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC
refused, [2001] 3 C.N.L.R. iv, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 625, online: QL (SCJ). Apparently, the Court
of Appeal treated this as an exercise ofjudicial discretion not to grant a declaratory order, rather
than as a case where the Court lacked jurisdiction: see ibid. at paras. 12, 21.
" See Amended Fresh Statement of Claim, 23 May 1996, The Chippewas of Sarnia
Band (Plaintiff) and Attorney General of Canada et al. (Defendants), Ontario Court (General
Division), Court File No. 95-CU-92484 [hereinafter Statement of Claim] at paras. 3-5. See also
ibid. para. 7, requesting damages for trespass on, but not seeking possession of, lands used by
other defendants for industrial, utility or commercial/retail purposes, "until satisfactorynegotiated
agreements are reached with respect to this land".
236 The assizes of novel disseisin and mort d'ancestor, the writs of entry, and the writ
ofrightwere the classic common law actions for the recovery ofpossession of land: see F. Pollock
& F. W. Maitland, The History ofEnglish Law Before the Time ofEdwardI, 2nd ed. reissued, vol.
2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) at 47-77; McNeil, supra note 154 at 17-37.
These were eventually replaced by the more expedient action ofejectment (now generally known
as an action for recovery ofland), which evolved out oftrespass: see A. G. Sedgwick & F. S. Wait,
"The History of the Action of Ejectment in England and the United States" in Association of
American Schools, ed., Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. 3 (Boston: Little
Brown & Co., 1909) 611; W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2nd ed., vol. 7 (London:
Methuen & Co., 1937) at 4-23. Regarding trespass, which is designed to protect possession, see
infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
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equitable remedies, they are not subject to judicial discretion. 7 A leading English
textbook, Snell's Principles of Equity, put it this way:
[E]quitable remedies are in general discretionary. At law, a plaintiff who
proved his case was entitled as of right not only to his judgment but also to
enforce it by the forms of execution available at law, however little his
conduct appealed to the court, however dilatory he had been, and however
unfair the result.
238
The fundamental nature of the protection accorded to property by the law of
trespass (and hence by the modem action for recovery of land, which developed out of
trespass239) was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Harrison v. Carswell.
Speaking for a majority of the Court, Dickson J. (as he then was) said:
Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has traditionally recognized, as a fundamental
freedom, the right of the individual to the enjoyment of property and the right
not to be deprived thereof, or of any interest therein, save by due process of
law. The legislature of Manitoba has declared in The Petty Trespasses Act
that any person who trespasses upon land, the property of another, upon or
through which he has been requested by the owner not to enter, is guilty of
an offence. If there is to be any change in this statute law, if A is to be given
the right to enter and remain on the land of B against the will of B, it would
seem to me that such a change must be made by the enacting institution, the
Legislature, which is representative of the people and designed to manifest
the political will, and not by the Court.
240
While Dickson J.'s opinion respecting the role of the Court in relation to trespass was
expressed in the context of the Manitoba statute under which the respondent had been
charged, he clearly acknowledged the connection between the statute and the common
law action of trespass, both of which were designed to protect property as a fundamental
" Where trespass is concerned, an entitlement to damages arises at law from proof of
the trespass: seeAnderson v. Skender (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 135 at 140-141, 17 C.C.L.T. (2d)
160 at 165-166 (B.C.C.A.). As Southin J.A. stated in Webb v. Attewell, "a landowner's right to
refuse entry upon his land to a neighbour is absolute and it is no part of a court's function to
penalize a refusing landowner for what the court perceives to be unneighbourly behavior": (1993),
108 D.L.R. 532 at 551, 18 C.C.L.T. (2d) 299 at 322 (B.C.C.A.). In contrast to this, where the
equitable remedy of an injunction is sought for trespass, a court does have discretion: see G.H.L.
Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, vol. I (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 39-41; Halsbury's
Laws of England, supra note 31, vol. 45(2) at paras. 526-27. However, a court should not deny
an injunction for reasons of private or even public inconvenience: see Lewvest v. Scotia Towers
Ltd. (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 239, 10 C.E.L.R. 139 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)). See also Walters, supra
note 203 at 10.14; Reynolds, supra note 230.
2"8 Baker & Langan, supra note 178 at 565-66 [emphasis added, footnote omitted]. See
also G. W. Keeton & L.A. Sheridan, Equity (London: Pitman & Sons, 1969) at 29; Meagher,
Gummow & Lehane, supra note 196 at para. 311.
239 See supra note 236.
240 Harrison v. Carswell, supra note 37 at 219.
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right.24 Dickson J.'s statement can therefore be regarded as equivalent to Lord Camden
C.J.'s classic pronouncement (made in the context of invasion of private property by
officers of the Crown242) of the role of the action of trespass in safeguarding property:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is
proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon
to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits
the fact, he is bound to shew by way ofjustification, that some positive law
has empowered or excused him. Thejustification is submitted to the judges,
who are to look into the books; and [see] if such a justification can be
maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the principles of common law.
If no such excuse can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an
authority against the defendant, and the plaintiff must have judgment.243
How, then, did the Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia avoid the
Chippewas' claims to possession and to damages for trespass? Despite the fact that these
claims were listed separately from the claims for declaratory relief in the Chippewas'
statement of claim, they were not dealt with as such by the Court. The Court summarized
the claims as follows:
The Chippewas started this action in 1995. In essence, they seek declaratory
relief recognizing their right to the disputed lands and damages for trespass
and breach of fiduciary duty. If the Chippewas obtain the declaratory relief
claimed, they would be entitled to possession of the land, although they have
made it clear that they are ready and willing to negotiate with the federal and
provincial governments and do not seek the wholesale eviction of the present
occupiers of the property.
244
Looking again at the statement of claim, the claims for damages for trespass and for writs
of possession were made against selected, mainly corporate defendants, whereas
damages for breach of fiduciary duty were sought against the Crown in right of Canada
and the Crown in right of Ontario. 45 While declaratory relief was sought against the
defendants generally, the Chippewas did not ask for damages for trespass or for writs of
possession against all of them, apparently because they did not want to dispossess or
cause hardship to families, schools, churches and other institutions. In fact, as the above
passage from the Court of Appeal's decision indicates, they preferred to settle their
claims by negotiation, and sought the Court's assistance in achieving that goal.246 In this
spirit ofreconciliation, it seems that counsel for the Chippewas did not press their claims
242 See also Russo v. Ontario Jockey Club, [1987] 62 O.R. (2d) 731 at 735,46 D.L.R.
(4") 359 at 363 (H.C.J.), where Boland J. stated that "Chief Justice Dickson in Harrison v.
Carswell, supra, has effectively precluded the possibility ofjudicial development in this area by
stating that only the legislature should make changes to the law of trespass".
242 See supra note 213.
243 Entick, supra note 39 at 1066 [emphasis added].
244 Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 3.
245 Statement of Claim, supra note 235 at paras. 3-7, 66-72 and accompanying text.
246 See also ibid. at paras. 7, 68.
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to possession (apart from their request for a vesting order) and to damages for trespass
before the Court of Appeal.247 The Court, in turn, appears to have used this willingness
to compromise against them by wrongly limiting their claims against all the defendants,
except the federal and provincial Crowns, to discretionary declaratory relief and vesting
orders, and then exercising its discretion against them.
There may, however, be more substantive reasons why the Court of Appeal did
not find it necessary to deal with the common law claims to possession and to damages
for trespass. As we have seen, the Court held that the 1853 Crown patent continued to
have legal effect until a court exercised its discretion to set it aside." As the Court
found this to be an appropriate case not to set it aside, the patent continued to have legal
effect. The Court may, therefore, have concluded that the patent barred the Chippewas
from obtaining their common law remedies. Alternatively, because the Court was of the
view that the good faith purchaser for value without notice rule can defeat legal as well
as equitable interests, it may have thought that the claims to possession and to damages
for trespass were barred by the application of that rule. Unfortunately, neither of these
explanations is explicit in thejudgment. Moreover, we have seen that the Court's views,
on the validity of Crown patents and on the application of the good faith purchaser rule
to legal interests, are contrary to fundamental legal principles and to long-standing
judicial authority.249
So has the Chippewas' title to the disputed lands been extinguished, and if it
has, how and when did this happen? While the Court of Appeal did not expressly say
that extinguishment had occurred, I think this result is implicit in the decision."5
However, the manner and time of extinguishment are problematic. The Court's
application ofthe good faith purchaser rule would suggest that extinguishment to ok place
when the lands passed into the hands of purchasers who had no knowledge of the
247 See Chippewas ofSarnia (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 278: "In oral argument before
this court, Mr. Cherniak on behalf of the Chippewas maintained the position that the primary relief
sought by the appellants was for a declaratory judgment, accompanied by a claim for an order
directing the negotiations. However, Mr, Chemiak also pointed out that the statement of claim
contained a claim for an immediate vesting order, and on behalf of his clients, he asserted that
claim should this court consider that a declaratory order should not be granted on discretionary
grounds." Note that an order for recovery of possession of land and a vesting order, though often
combined in onejudgment, are distinct remedies: see Lawson, supra note 212 at 235-36, 282-84.
In their Statement of Claim, the Chippewas requested both as against three corporate defendants:
supra note 235 at paras. 3-5. Also, as acknowledged by the Court of Appeal (see text
accompanying supra note 244), but ignored by it in the rest of its judgment, the claim for damages
for trespass, while not pressed, was maintained: see Refiled Factum of the Appellant, The
Chippewas of Sarnia Band, 17 May 2000, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Court File Nos. C32170,
C32188, C32202 at paras. 51-52 [hereinafter Factum].
248 See text accompanying supra note 195.
249 See text accompanying supra notes 197-233.
250 Otherwise, the absence ofjudicial remedies would not necessarily bar the Chippewas
from exercising the self-help remedy of entry, which was surely not a possibility envisaged by the
Court of Appeal. Moreover, if extinguishment did not occur, then, as Kerry Wilkins has pointed
out to me, the disputed lands are probably still "Lands reserved for the Indians" for the purposes
of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and thus are within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Again, I doubt that this is what the Court had in mind.
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Chippewas' title, a process that was complete by 1861.251 However, as this was before
the Judicature Acts that, in the Court's opinion, brought about a fusion of law and
equity,;2 presumably extinguishment by this means could have occurred only when
subsequent good faith purchasers acquired the lands afterthe enactment of those statutes
in the 1870s. This raises another issue, as by then section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867, had conferred exclusive jurisdiction over "Lands reserved for the Indians" on the
Parliament of Canada. As the disputed lands would no doubt have come within the
scope of this provision if the Chippewas' title was unextinguished in 1867,253 application
of the good faith purchaser rule after that time would have the effect of moving those
lands from federal to provincial jurisdiction. We have seen, however, that provincial
statutes of limitation cannot cause this to happen for division of powers reasons.254 For
a court to be able to do it by discretionary application of a private law property rule is
just as questionable.255 At the very least, one would expect a court to take the
constitutional implications of this into account, before deciding whether to exercise its
discretion. The Court of Appeal's failure to do so suggests to me that they were unaware
of the problem.
Another possibility is that extinguishment occurred in 1853, when the Crown
issued the patent that granted the disputed lands to Cameron. We have seen that the
Court of Appeal held (wrongly, as I have attempted to show) that the patent continued
to have legal effect until set aside by a court. 6 So the Court's view appears to have
been that, although the patent extinguished the Chippewas' title, the extinguishment
could be undone by a court exercising its discretion to set the patent aside. This is the
reverse of the situation just discussed, where the exercise ofjudicial discretion in favour
of good faith purchasers had the effect of moving lands from federal to provincial
jurisdiction. If a court set aside the patent and restored the lands to the Chippewas, the
lands would be moved from provincial to federal jurisdiction, because they would once
again become "Lands reserved for the Indians". So whether extinguishment occurred as
a result of the good faith purchases or the issuance of the patent, the same problem
arises: without even acknowledging that it was doing so, the Court assumed judicial
discretion to move lands from the jurisdiction of one government to another, which
would have the dual effect of substituting one body of applicable law for another and
redistributing constitutional authority over those lands.257 Given this display ofjudicial
251 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
3 See Smith v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 237; Canadian
Pacific, supra note 2; St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657, 147
D.L.R. (4 th) 385; Osoyoos Indian Band, supra note 16.
See supra note 142.
'5 One would think that federal involvement would be required. In Delgamuukw,
Lamer C.J. said that, "... although on extinguishment of aboriginal title, the province would take
complete title to the land, the jurisdiction to extinguish lies with the federal government": supra
note 1 at para. 175.
26 See supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
While judges often decide division of powers cases that determine applicable law
and constitutional authority in relation to various matters, they do not do so on a discretionary
basis. Their decisions in these cases are based on interpretation of constitutional provisions, not
upon their view ofwhat is fair and equitable in the particular circumstances before them. In these
kinds of constitutional cases, the role of the courts is thus to draw jurisdictional lines; unlike the
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constitutional wizardry, it is all the more regrettable that the Supreme Court of Canada
rejected the Chippewas' application for leave to appeal.258
V. CONCLUSIONS
Ever since Confederation, the provinces have lacked the constitutional authority
to extinguish Aboriginal title. From at least the time of the enactment of the Statute of
Westminster, 1931, the Parliament of Canada had the authority to extinguish Aboriginal
title as long as its intent to do so was clearly and plainly expressed, but that authority was
taken away when Aboriginal and treaty rights were recognized and affirmed by section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Constitutional amendment aside, one therefore
would have thought that the effect of section 35(1) would have been to make post-1982
extinguishment of Aboriginal title dependent upon the consent of the Aboriginal title
holders, which might only be given if their Aboriginal law permitted a complete
surrender of their title. According to the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in the
Chippewas of Sarnia case, however, this is not entirely correct. Despite the absence of
both a valid surrender and legislative extinguishment, the Court held that present-day
judicial discretion can be exercised in appropriate circumstances to deny a remedy to
Aboriginal title holders whose lands were wrongfully taken in the past. This looks very
much like a new form of extinguishment by judicial pronouncement.
One might sympathize with the judges in the Chippewas ofSarnia case, for they
were in a truly difficult position. They were faced with competing claims to lands by
innocent parties - the Chippewas and the current possessors - and they had to make a
decision. Their solution, however, was to dismiss all the Chippewas' claims against the
innocent possessors, while allowing their claims for damages against the not-so-innocent
Crown in right of Canada and Ontario to proceed. One problem with this is that it sends
a message to Aboriginal people that they cannot depend on the Canadian legal system
to uphold their claims to lands that were wrongfully taken from them in the past. The
Court of Appeal's decision indicates that, regardless ofthe legal validity of their claims,
judges will not necessarily allow those claims to prevail if they conflict with the claims
of other Canadians who did not participate in and were not aware of the wrongs that were
committed. Decisions like this will undoubtedly undermine the already shaky faith that
Aboriginal people have in Canadian courts. This is particularly so whenjudges disregard
or change well-established legal rules in order to deny Aboriginal claims."' As this
article has attempted to demonstrate, this is precisely what the Court of Appeal did in the
Chippewas of Sarnia case.
This relates to a second major problem with the Court of Appeal's decision.
In Part Two of this article, we saw that property rights have always enjoyed special
protection in Anglo-Canadian law. For centuries, the nemo dat rule has generally
Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia (supra note 9), they generally do not assume that they
can toss subject matter across those lines if they think that will produce what they regard as ajust
result in a particular case.
" Leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (8 November 2001), supra note 9.
259 For other instances of this, see K. McNeil, "The Vulnerability of Indigenous Land
Rights in Australia and Canada" in J. McLaren, N. Wright & A. Buck, eds., Property Rights in
the Colonial Imagination and Experience (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
forthcoming).
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prevented common law property rights from being defeated by wrongful transfer, even
to innocent third parties. Additional protection against Crown taking has been provided
by the fundamental constitutional principle that the executive cannot infringe or destroy
anyone's property rights without clear and plain legislative authority. As Dickson J.
observed in Harrison v. Carswell, any change to the fundamental protections accorded
to property rights should be made by legislatures, not courts.26 And yet, in order to deny
recovery against the current possessors of the disputed lands in the Chippewas ofSarnia
case, the Court of Appeal did make two major changes to the law relating to the
protection ofproperty rights: it decided that the good faith purchaser rule applies to legal
interests in land, and held that Crown patents that are inconsistent with existing property
rights prevail over those rights until set aside by a court. More disturbing still, the Court
did not even acknowledge that these aspects of its decision were major deviations from
fundamental principles and long-standing precedents. Instead, it acted as though it was
simply applying established law. This raises serious questions about the role of the
courts in adjudicating Aboriginal claims, and the impact on the law generally of
decisions involving Aboriginal rights.26
The courts are obviously going to have to achieve some kind of balance
between Aboriginal rights and the interests of innocent third parties in these kinds of
cases. In my respectful opinion, however, the Court ofAppeal failed to achieve any such
balance in the Chippewas ofSarnia case. The interests of the current possessors of the
disputed lands prevailed entirely over the rights of the Chippewas, to the detriment of the
legal system generally. The willingness of the Chippewas to compromise by not asking
for possession or damages against most of the possessors was simply ignored by the
Court. Nor was their desire to seek reconciliation through negotiation supported.262
Where Aboriginal claimants are willing to accept innovative solutions that take into
account the interests of others,263 judicial creativity should be directed towards finding
260 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
261 In Scott, Lord Shaw warned of the risks inherent in judicial erosion of fundamental
constitutional principles: "The right of the citizen and the working of the Constitution in the sense
which I have described have upon the whole since the fall of the Stuart dynasty received from the
judiciary - and they appear to me still to demand of it - a constant and most watchful respect.
There is no greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of
rules of procedure, and at the instance ofjudges themselves" (supra note 224 at 477-78).
262 Compare Chief Justice Lamer's closing words in his judgment in Delgamuukw
'Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides,
reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet,
supra [note 8], at para. 3 1, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act, 1982] - 'the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty ofthe Crown'. Let
us face it, we are all here to stay" (supra note I at para. 186). See also K. Roach, Constitutional
Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994) at §§15.590-688,
suggesting that declaratoryjudgments provide flexibility for achieving negotiated settlements of
Aboriginal rights.
263 The extent to which the Chippewas were willing to compromise is revealed by their
Statement of Claim, supra note 235 at paras. 7 and 68, and their Factum, supra note 247 at paras.
67-75, under the heading "The Appropriate Remedy". Para. 72(e) of the Factum, for example,
reads: "The Chippewas have always maintained a willingness to negotiate with the Crown, and
in its pleadings has publicly expressed a willingness to consider an 'absolute surrender' of
properties used for residential and institutional purposes and a 'conditional surrender' of
2001-2002]
Ottawa Law Review / Revue de droit d'Ottawa
solutions that achieve an appropriate balance and at the same time abide by fundamental
principles.264 Unfortunately, the creativity shown by the Court of Appeal in this instance
failed to achieve either of these objectives.
properties used for other purposes" [footnotes omitted]. See also para. 73(c), suggesting as well
that the Crown could use its authority under s. 31 of the Indian Act, supra note 140, "to restore
physical possession of surplus [i.e. vacant] properties to the Chippewas for their exclusive use,
occupation and benefit and compensate the occupants" (s. 31 provides that the Attorney General
of Canada may bring an action by way of information against non-Indians for trespass on or
unlawful occupation or possession of reserve lands).
264 For example, in Re Manitoba Language Rights the Supreme Court achieved a
balance between constitutional French language rights in Manitoba and the need to preserve
.societal order by relying on the principle of the rule of law to justify delaying its order of
invalidity of Manitoba statutes that had been enacted only in English for a reasonable time to
enable the government to translate the statutes into French and have the legislature re-enact them:
supra note 224.
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